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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICES, OFFICE OF 
RECOVERY SERVICES, 
Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
V, 
BETTY A. WHITAKER, 
Defendant-
Appellant. , 
Case No. 860673 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err in refusing to dismiss 
plaintiff's complaint when an administrative proceeding was 
pending between the same parties for the purpose of adjudicat-
ing the identical issues? 
2. Did plaintiff meet its burden of proof in estab-
lishing the correct amount of overpayment claimed under its 
verified complaint? 
3. Did the district court err as a matter of law in 
holding that the one-half equity interest in the home was 
actually available to defendant? 
4. Did the district court err in awarding plaintiff 
attorney fees when the record contains no evidence on this 
claim? 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final judgment (Appendix 
"A") entered against defendant on November 24, 1986 which 
ordered and decreed that plaintiff was to have and recover 
judgment against defendant for $1,985.38- The judgment was 
awarded following a trial before the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde 
who entered his memorandum decision on October 14, 1986. 
(Appendix "B") In his decision, Judge Hyde found that defendant 
had received public assistance benefits to which she was not 
entitled because of an equity interest in a home which she had 
received as part of a divorce settlement. 
Plaintiff initiated this action on October 16, 1985 
by the filing of a complaint with the district court alleging 
that the defendant had received public assistance overpayments. 
At the time the complaint was filed, defendant was contesting 
the alleged overpayment through administrative procedures 
established by the Office of Recovery Services (nORS,f). Plain-
tiff filed its complaint for the express purpose of obtaining a 
pre-judgment writ of attachment which was entered by Judge Hyde 
on October 16, 1985 (Appendix "C") and continued by Judge John 
F. Wahlquist on October 23, 1985. (Appendix ffDff) Defendant 
filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint on the basis 
that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, 
since the statute required plaintiff to exhaust administrative 
remedies before seeking further relief in the district court. 
On December 26, 1985, Judge Hyde denied defendant's motion and 
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defendant sought permission for appeal to the Utah Supreme 
Court which was denied. A trial was then held before Judge 
Hyde on October 2, 1986 which resulted in his Memorandum 
Decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Public Assistance System in Utah 
The state of Utah provides public assistance to needy 
persons under authority found at U.C.A. Sec. 55-15a-l ejt seq. 
Among other forms of assistance available, Utah administers a 
state General Assistance program ("GA") which provides cash 
payments to the unemployable. U.C.A. Sec. 55-15a-17. It 
provides limited medical assistance to those suffering acute or 
life-threatening illnesses under the Utah Medical Assistance 
program. (Formerly designated Indigent Medical) ("IM"). 
Finally, Utah participates in the federally funded Food Stamp 
program and administers benefits through its state agency and 
local district offices. The federal authority for the Food 
Stamp program is found at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq. 
Recovery of Overpayments 
The authority establishing the public assistance 
programs further establishes income and resource limitations 
which applicants must comply with in order to receive benefits. 
The statute provides, in part, that after certain exceptions 
are applied (home, automobile) single individuals may not own 
real or personal property exceeding $1,500.00 in value. U.C.A. 
§ 55-15a-15(3). A recipient who is found to have exceeded this 
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requirement is determined to have incurred an overpayment. The 
determination of whether an overpayment has been incurred is 
made by the DSS district office where the recipient resides. A 
Notice of Decision is mailed to the recipient advising of the 
determination and setting forth the recipient's hearing rights. 
The state authority for determining and recovering 
public assistance overpayments is found at U.C.A. Sec. 
55-15a-24. The statute provides in relevant part: 
(1) Any person who engages in any of the 
following acts shall be liable to the state 
of Utah for the value of all funds or other 
benefits received by any person as a result 
of those acts: 
a. receiving assistance payments, medical 
services, food stamps or any other 
thing of value under the provisions of 
this chapter, to which they were not 
entitled. 
The statute further provides authority for recovery of the 
overpayment: 
(7)(a) The department [DSS] shall take all 
necessary steps to recover the repayments 
required under this section; however, the 
department under administrative rules may 
use discretion in recovering small overpay-
ments unintentionally received as a result 
of administrative error. In addition to 
other authorized procedures, it may file a 
civil action against any individual, 
corporation, business or association 
determined by it to owe money to this state 
under this section. If an action is filed, 
the,department may recover, in addition to 
the principal sum plus interest, a reason-
able amount as attorneys1 fees and its 
costs incurred. If the repayment obligation 
arises from overpayment due to administra-
tive error, attorney's fees and interest 
may not be recovered. U.C.A. § 
55-15a-24(7)(a). 
D 
A recipient notified of an overpayment determination 
is given certain rights to contest the overpayment through a 
hearing at the administrative level. The relevant statute 
provides, in part: 
Any applicant for, or recipient of, assis-
tance, food stamps, or medical assistance 
aggrieved because of a decision or delay in 
making a decision, may appeal and is 
entitled to reasonable notice and a hear-
ing. U.C.A. § 55-15a-25 
The Office of Recovery Services (ORS), a branch of 
DSS, is responsible for the collection of overpayments. 
Pursuant to its authority to collect overpayments, ORS has 
issued regulations outlining certain procedures for the admin-
istrative hearing process. (Appendix "E") ORS introduces its 
regulations by noting that its procedures are a necessary part 
of the legal system for determining and recovering overpay-
ments : 
Due to the nature of ORS collection pro-
grams, the assistance of the legal system 
is often sought. In many cases civil or 
criminal proceedings may be initiated to 
enforce collections and to act as a deter-
rence to continued program fraud and abuse. 
In addition, federal regulations require 
states to provide an administrative hearing 
process in several programs administered by 
the Bureau of General Collections. 
The objective of this section is to outline 
the procedures for the administrative 
hearing processes and for pursuing civ-
il/criminal actions. Vol. Ill § 200 
The ORS regulations then go on to set forth in detail a recipi-
ent's rights in regard to a fair hearing. Utah-DSS-ORS Vol III 
Sec. 200 et seq. The regulations make clear that the fair 
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hearing process applies to financial, medical and Food Stamp 
overpayments. Vol. Ill § 201. The regulations further estab-
lish that an ORS team supervisor or a designated investigator 
is to prepare and present the department's case at the hearing. 
Vol III § 202.3. The fair hearing officer is required to issue 
a decision setting forth findings of fact and advising the 
recipient of the right to appeal an unfavorable decision. Vol. 
Ill Sec. 202.6. Within twenty days of an unfavorable decision, 
a recipient may appeal a decision to the director of adminis-
trative hearings (Vol. Ill Sec. 202.11), who is the administra-
tive hearing examiner referred to in the statute. The regula-
tion further advises that any further appeals must be made 
through the legal process. Vol. Ill Sec. 202.11-1.c. Finally, 
the regulations provide that an administrative decision does 
not prohibit the department from initiating a civil action in 
court. Vol. Ill § 202.11-2. (Emphasis added) 
The statute further establishes that either party may 
obtain further review of an unfavorable hearing decision. The 
statute provides, in part: 
The department through its administrative 
hearing examiner may, upon its own motion, 
review any decision of a local or district 
office and consider and determine any 
application upon which a decision has not 
been made within a reasonable time. U.C.A. 
§ 55-15a-25. 
After the remedies available at the administrative 
level have been exhausted, the statute then provides for 
judicial review: 
All decisions of the administrative hearing 
examiner are final and binding upon any 
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local, district, or state office, except 
that any party may appeal an administrative 
order to the district court and obtain a 
trial de novo of the matter by filing a 
petition in the appropriate district court 
within 30 days after receipt of notice of 
the administrative order. . . . 
ORS has established a second procedure for determi-
nation and recovery of overpayments through the administrative 
process. Vol. Ill Sec. 240 et seq. (Appendix "F") The 
regulations, promulgated in February, 1985, cite as their 
authority U.C.A. Sec. 55-15e-l. (Appendix "G") The statute 
makes clear that it was enacted to give ORS authority to 
establish through the administrative process the existence of a 
public assistance overpayment and to have that determination 
reduced to an administrative order which can be docketed as a 
judgment in the district court. U.C.A. §§ 55-15e~2,-4,-8. The 
statute allows for judicial review after completion of the 
administrative hearing process: 
When findings and an order have been 
entered by the administrative hearing 
examiner subsequent to a hearing, judicial 
review of those findings and order may be 
secured by any person adversely affected 
thereby by filing a petition in the dis-
trict court. . .U.C.A. § 55-15e-6(l). 
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Facts Relevant to the Determination and Recovery of an Alleged 
Overpayment To Defendant 
Defendant was divorced from her husband on December 
8, 1981. On May 19, 1983, she applied to DSS for Indigent 
Medical Assistance and Food Stamps. (R-97-100) Her case was 
opened and subsequently closed in November, 1983. Defendant 
made a second application for IM and Food Stamps on January 4, 
1984, which case was closed March 30, 1984. (Rlll-14) Defen-
dant made a third application for GA, IM and Food Stamps on May 
2, 1984. (R101-04) This case was closed effective November 
30, 1984, based on alleged excess resources. 
On November 14, 1984, a Notice of Decision was issued 
by DSS advising defendant that her assistance case would be 
closed because her assets were greater than policy allowed. 
(Appendix "H") On November 19, 1984, defendant received a 
letter from ORS Investigator Terry Schow, notifying her that 
she had been overpaid $1,116 in Food Stamps for the time period 
of June, 1983 through July, 1984. (Appendix "1-1"). In his 
letter, Schow advised that failure to contact him would require 
ORS to take a different and stronger legal course of action. 
Defendant received a second letter from Mr. Schow, dated 
December 6, 1984, notifying her that she had been overpaid $80 
in GA financial assistance for the time period of May, 1984 
through October, 1984. (Appendix "1-2"). Finally, on December 
12, 1984, Schow sent defendant a third letter advising of 
possible further legal action. (Appendix "1-3"). 
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Through a representative at Utah Legal Services, 
defendant requested a fair hearing on or about December 26, 
1984, by the filing of Form 490 as provided in Utah-DSS-ORS 
Vol. Ill §201,1 (Appendix "J"). Owing to defendant's illnesses 
and other causes, a hearing on her request was not held until 
September 17, 1985, before Fair Hearing Officer Neal Bernson. 
Defendant was represented at the hearing by Utah Legal Services 
attorney Curt Child who presented testimony and other evidence 
as well as a brief. ORS was represented by Investigator Terry 
Schow who presented the case for the state. The Fair Hearing 
Officer took the matter under advisement. 
On August 26, 1985, before the administrative fair 
hearing and before the filing of plaintiff's verified com-
plaint, ORS served defendant with the necessary papers for the 
determination of an overpayment pursuant to U.C.A. § 55-15e-l 
and the regulations at Utah-DSS-ORS §§ 240 et seq. (Appendix 
"K") The "Notice Packet" served included: 
1. Notice of Overpayment Determination, 
Form 743.1; 
2. Notice of Informal Settlement Confer-
ence, Form 743.2; 
3. Legal Rights/Written Answer, Form 826; 
and 
4. Income/Asset Affidavit (Appendix MK"). 
The forms served were all of those required by ORS regulations 
for the determination and recovery of an overpayment through 
the administrative process. Utah-DSS-ORS Vol. Ill § 241.2. 
The notices were signed by T, Schow, Investigator. 
On October 16, 1985, plaintiff filed its Verified 
Complaint (Appendix "L") seeking recovery of the same 
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overpayment at issue before the Fair Hearing Officer and the 
subject of the ORS Notice of Overpayment served by T. Schow on 
August 26, 1985. On the basis of its complaint, plaintiff 
received a pre-judgment writ of attachment in the amount of 
$2,500 from a payment to be made to the First District Court 
clerk's office, representing a portion of defendant's share of 
a divorce settlement. A hearing was held on plaintiff's 
pre-judgment writ of attachment on October 21, 1985 and the 
Order continued by the Honorable John F. Wahlquist. The Court 
further ordered that plaintiff post a bond in the amount of 
$5,000. 
On October 24, 1985, defendant filed her motion to 
dismiss, asserting a lack of jurisdiction in the district 
court. On November 5, 1985, in an apparent effort to improve 
its legal position in resisting the motion to dismiss, ORS, 
through its representative T. Schow, Investigator, filed a 
Notice of Dismissal of Notice of Overpayment Determination 
(Appendix f!M") . Defendant's counsel objected to the attempted 
dismissal and no order was ever issued by the administrative 
hearing examiner dismissing plaintiff's Notice of Overpayment 
Determination. On December 26, 1985, defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss was denied. On August 11, 1986, Fair Hearing Officer 
Neal Bernson issued a hearing decision in defendant's case in 
» 
which he declined to consider the legal issues raised, but 
sustained the decision of the district office in finding an 
overpayment. The decision was appealed to the administrative 
hearing examiner who has not issued a decision. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In Point I, defendant argues that the district court 
erred in failing to dismiss plaintiff's case for lack of 
jurisdiction. Defendant sets out the statutory authority for 
the recovery of overpayments and the regulations which the 
state of Utah has promulgated for the purpose of such collec-
tion. She then argues that the plain language of these stat-
utes and regulations require the state to first exhaust admin-
istrative remedies before initiating an action at the judicial 
level. She explains the reasoning behind the doctrine, the 
applicable exceptions and concludes that the doctrine was 
applicable in this case. 
In Point II, defendant argues that plaintiff failed 
to carry its burden of proof in establishing the actual amount 
of overpayment alleged. She examines the exhibits and testimo-
ny offered by plaintiff to prove this element of its case and 
concludes that the weight of the evidence was insufficient, 
since the exhibits relied on were summaries of information 
compiled by persons not present at the trial to testify. 
In Point III, defendant urges that the court erred as 
a matter of law in finding that the asset in question was 
available to her. She reviews the long line of federal and 
state authority interpreting the term "actually available" and 
concludes that the equity interest was not includable as a 
resource until the payment representing her portion of the 
equity interest was paid into the court. 
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In Point IV, defendant points out that no record was 
established to support plaintiff's claim for attorney fees and, 
accordingly, the judgment should be corrected to strike the 
award, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING 
TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR 
FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE 
REMEDIES AS REQUIRED BY THE STATUTE 
In his ruling on defendant's Motion to Dismiss, dated 
December 26, 1985, (Appendix "N") Judge Hyde stated in part: 
"I can determine no statutory prohibition 
against the state commencing this action, 
and the doctrine of exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies does not appear to be 
applicable." 
Defendant submits that when plaintiff's complaint is considered 
in light of relevant statutory authority and case law, it 
should be concluded that the statute required plaintiff to 
exhaust the administrative remedies provided before seeking 
further relief at the judicial level. 
The only language in plaintiff's complaint which can 
arguably be construed as an allegation of jurisdiction is 
contained in the equivocal wording of paragraph 4 which pro-
vides: 
The defendant has a duty to repay the 
overpayment, but has refused to do so. 
Defendant has requested a fair hearing 
before the District II (A) OCO-APA Office 
and the hearing officer has taken the 
matter under advisement. If the hearing 
officer rules against the defendant, it is 
doubtful that she will pay the debt and 
direct action against her would be 
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required. If the hearing officer rules 
against the State, the State has a right to 
obtain a trial de novo before the District 
Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
55-15a-25, which would require direct 
action against the defendant. This com-
plaint is filed for either purpose. 
Far from being an allegation of facts conferring present 
jurisdiction on the district court, the paragraph posits 
jurisdiction with the court based upon events which have not 
yet occurred: (1) An unfavorable administrative decision which 
defendant refused to pay or (2) a decision favorable to defen-
dant which would trigger plaintiff1s right to a trial de novo 
under U.C.A. Sec. 55-15a-25. At the time plaintiff filed its 
complaint, neither event had occurred. Instead, the very 
issues which plaintiff sought to litigate in the district court 
were pending in the administrative system pursuant to rules and 
regulations promulgated by plaintiffs for that very purpose. 
Plaintiff's deficient assertion of jurisdiction is an 
implicit acknowledgment that the requirements of the statute 
for filing a judicial action had not yet been met. Specifical-
ly, U.C.A. Sec. 55-15a-25 required the issuance of an adminis-
trative order before a party would be permitted to seek review 
by trial de novo in the district court. Similarly, U.C.A. § 
55-15e-l required the issuance of "findings and an order" by 
the administrative hearing examiner prior to seeking judicial 
review. U.C.A. § 55-15e-6. Plaintiff at the time of filing its 
complaint had neither findings nor an order issued by the 
administrative hearing examiner. Moreover, plaintiff's own 
regulations acknowledge that a civil action may follow a 
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required. If the hearing officer rules 
against the State, the State has a right to 
obtain a trial de novo before the District 
Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
55-15a-25, which would require direct 
action against the defendant. This com-
plaint is filed for either purpose. 
Far from being an allegation of facts conferring present 
jurisdiction on the district court, the paragraph posits 
jurisdiction with the court based upon events which have not 
yet occurred: (1) An unfavorable administrative decision which 
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issues which plaintiff sought to litigate in the district court 
were pending in the administrative system pursuant to rules and 
regulations promulgated by plaintiffs for that very purpose. 
Plaintiff's deficient assertion of jurisdiction is an 
implicit acknowledgment that the requirements of the statute 
for filing a judicial action had not yet been met. Specifical-
ly, U.C.A. Sec. 55-15a-25 required the issuance of an adminis-
trative order before a party would be permitted to seek review 
by trial de novo in the district court. Similarly, U.C.A. § 
55-15e-l required the issuance of "findings and an order" by 
the administrative hearing examiner prior to seeking judicial 
review. U.C.A. § 55-15e-6. Plaintiff at the time of filing its 
complaint had neither findings nor an order issued by the 
administrative hearing examiner. Moreover, plaintiff's own 
regulations acknowledge that a civil action may follow a 
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decision at the administrative level, but do not mention 
concurrent proceedings. 
Significantly, neither statute even uses the word 
"complaint" in describing the further judicial review avail-
able. Instead, the statutes use the term "petition" as the 
proper pleading for obtaining a trial de novo or judicial 
review. U.C.A. § 55-15a-25; U.C.A. § 55-15e-6. Nowhere in 
plaintiff's complaint is there an assertion of jurisdiction 
based on facts existing as of October 16, 1985; nowhere is 
there an assertion of statutory authority for filing a com-
plaint in district court. Plaintiff's pleading is simply 
devoid of allegations sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of 
the district court on October 16, 1985. 
In its argument before the district court, plaintiff 
relied heavily on U.C.A. Sec. 55-15a-24(7)(a) to support its 
attempt to confer jurisdiction on the district court. More 
specifically, plaintiff identified the following language as 
the basis for its action: 
"In addition to other authorized proce-
dures, it may file a civil action against 
any individual . . . " 
The cited language, which on its face is permissive, cannot be 
reasonably interpreted as allowing plaintiff to commence a 
civil action when the matter is already being litigated through 
administrative procedures. It is reasonable to conclude that 
the legislature intended to permit plaintiff a choice of forums 
before the commencement of an action but did not intend to 
permit the concurrent litigation of the same case at both the 
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administrative and judicial levels. More appropriately, the 
cited language would apply when a defendant had not requested 
an administrative hearing, or had exceeded the ninety-day time 
limit for requesting such a hearing, and it was determined 
necessary by plaintiff to initiate a civil action in circuit or 
district court. 
The lf[i]n addition to other authorized procedures" 
language can reasonably be read as referring to the procedure 
for determination of overpayments by ORS under U.C.A. § 
55-15e-l et: seq. As the scenario of events outlined previously 
shows, ORS initiated such procedures on August 26, 1985 when it 
served defendant with its Notice Packet under Vol. Ill § 240 et 
seq. Under that procedure, ORS, if successful, would be 
entitled to an administrative order which it could docket as a 
judgment. Although the statute allows for other procedures to 
recover an overpayment, it does not authorize the concurrent 
utilization of procedures in both the administrative and 
judicial forums. Plaintiffs, by their actions, have caused the 
incongruous result of actions proceeding under three separate 
grants of authority: 
1. The fair hearing procedure under 
U.C.A. § 55-15a-25 and Utah-DSS-ORS 
Vol. Ill §§ 201 et seq.; 
2. The Administrative Determination of 
Overpayments procedure under U.C.A. § 
. 55-15e-l et seq. and Utah DSS-ORS Vol. 
Ill §§ 240 et seq.; and 
3. The judicial procedure under plain-
tiff's assertion of possible, future 
jurisdiction. 
If the language of U.C.A. § 55-15a-24(7)(a) is read 
as a broad grant of authority for plaintiff to initiate civil 
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actions while concurrently pursuing the same result through the 
administrative system, then a wasteful and disruptive element 
is introduced into the Utah decisionmaking process. The 
undesirable consequences of possible conflicting judgments, 
waste of court and attorney time are so obvious as to require 
little explication. 
It is well established in Utah law that before a 
matter pending before an administrative agency may be reviewed 
in district court, a plaintiff must first have exhausted 
administrative remedies. Johnson v. Utah State Retirement 
Office, 621 P.2d 1234 (Ut. 1980). The holding in Johnson is 
particularly relevant to the issues under consideration in this 
case. In Johnson, employees of Payson City Hospital brought an 
action to recover employer contributions to the state retire-
ment fund. The relevant section of the Utah State Retirement 
Act provides that a determination by the retirement board is 
final, "except that a member if he so desires may appeal the 
decision of the board to a district court of the state of 
Utah." Id, at 1237. The court observed: 
"Pursuant to this provision, an adverse 
determination by the administrator must be 
reviewed by the board of review before the 
right to judicial review attaches. The 
right of appeal afforded a dissatisfied 
member is statutory and dependent upon 
compliance with the terms of the statute 
authorizing such review. Ross v. Industri-
al Comm'n, 82 Ariz. 9, 307 P.2d 612 (1957). 
See Campbell Building Co. v. State Road 
Comm'n, 95 Utah 242, 70 P.2d 857 (1937). 
Id, at 1237. 
In State Department of Social Services v, Higgs, 656 
P.2d. 998, 1001 (Ut. 1982) the Court considered U.C.A. § 
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67-19-25 (State Officers and Employees), which permits district 
court review of an unfavorable personnel review board decision. 
The Court stated: 
The complaint filed in the district court 
did not validly invoke the jurisdiction of 
the district court because there was no 
then existing statute authorizing the 
exercise of such jurisdiction. Therefore, 
Archer and Agee are not dispositive. The 
statute in effect when the State filed, its 
complaint in the district court required 
defendants to complete all available 
administrative procedrues prior to filing 
a petition for judicial review in the 
district court, and this the State failed 
to do. It is elementary that administra-
tive remedies, except in rare instances, 
must first be exhausted before resort may 
be had to judicial review. Johnson v. Utah 
State Retirement Bd., Utah, 621 P.2d 1234 
(1980); Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law § 595 
(1962). Thus, under the law in effect at 
the time of filing the complaint, the 
Personnel Management Act, the district 
court correctly held that the administra-
tive procedures had not been exhausted and 
properly dismissed the complaint. 
Applying the same reasoning, the Court in Merrihew v. Salt Lake 
County Planning, 659 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Ut. 1983) held that 
exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to 
seeking judicial review of the denial of a building permit. 
In Clark v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 914, 916 (Ut. 1981) the 
Court noted that under the statute in question (U.C.A. 
§73-3-14), once a rehearing on an application to appropriate 
water rights had been granted, judicial review was premature. 
The Court then summarized several good reasons for requiring 
exhaustion of administrative remedies: 
In the case at hand we deal with an admin-
istrative agency that has expertise in an 
area that requires highly technical 
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knowledge. The Engineer must render orders 
on the best technical evidence available 
and often in the absence of conclusive evi-
dence. We recognize that despite these 
facts, the Legislature has provided for a 
trial de novo of the agency's determina-
tion. Nevertheless, full play must be 
accorded the administrative process, 
including a rehearing of the issues in this 
case. Nor do we see any prejudice to the 
plaintiffs since the Engineer's decision 
might be favorable to them. Id., at 916. 
The Court's reasoning applies with equal force to the 
issue raised in this appeal. The administrative hearing office 
established by plaintiff has expertise in a highly specialized 
area of law: eligibility for public assistance. The relevant 
statutes and regulations governing eligibility for financial, 
medical and Food Stamps comprise several volumes at the state 
and federal levels. The regulations change regularly and 
require a specialized expertise that does not exist outside the 
Social Services system. The hearing officer and administrative 
hearing examiner handle a multitude of public assistance cases 
and have a ready familiarity with the facts and issues of law 
presented. Although U.C.A. § 55-15a-l provides for a trial de 
novo, there is good reason for allowing the administrative 
process to run its course before involving the judicial system. 
The wisdom contained in the doctrine of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies has been well expressed in decisions by 
the United State Supreme Court. In McKart v. United States, 
395 U.S. 185, 89 S. Ct. 1657, 23 L. Ed. 2d. 194 (1969) the 
Supreme Court noted that application of the doctrine to specif-
ic cases "requires an understanding of its purposes and of the 
particular administrative scheme involved.f! Id, at 203. The 
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Court then delineated those cases in which the doctrine is 
relevant, including cases where the relevant statute provides 
that administrative procedures are exclusive. The Court 
opined: 
The reasons for making such procedure 
exclusive, and for the judicial application 
of the exhaustion doctrine in cases where 
the statutory requirement of exclusivity is 
not so explicit, are not difficult to 
understand. A primary purpose is, of 
course, the avoidance of premature inter-
ruption of the administrative process. The 
agency, like a trial court, is created for 
the purpose of applying a statute in the 
first instance. Accordingly, it is normal-
ly desirable to let the agency develop the 
necessary factual background upon which 
decisions should be based. And since 
agency decisions are frequently of a 
discretionary nature or frequently require 
expertise, the agency should be given the 
first chance to exercise that discretion or 
to apply that expertise. And of course it 
is generally more efficient for the admin-
istrative process to go forward without 
interruption than it is to permit the 
parties to seek aid from the courts at 
various intermediate stages. The very same 
reasons lie behind judicial rules sharply 
limiting interlocutory appeals. 
Id, at 203. 
The second reason identified by the Supreme Court was that the 
exhaustion doctrine is "an expression of executive and admin-
istrative autonomy." M , at 203. The Court observed that 
administrative agencies are created as separate entities and 
invested with powers and duties which should not be interfered 
with until the agency has completed its action. Id. Finally, 
the Court noted that judicial review may be hindered in certain 
cases by failing to allow the agency to ffmake a factual record, 
- 20 -
or to exercise its discretion or apply its expertise." Id. The 
Court added: 
In addition, other justifications for 
requiring exhaustion in cases of this sort 
have nothing to do with the dangers of 
interruption of the administrative process. 
Certain very practical notions of judicial 
efficiency come into play as well. A 
complaining party may be successful in 
vindicating his rights in the administra-
tive process. If he is required to pursue 
his administrative remedies, the courts may 
never have to intervene. And notions of 
administrative autonomy require that the 
agency be given a chance to discover and 
correct its own errors. Finally, it is 
possible that frequent and deliberate 
flouting of administrative processes could 
weaken the effectiveness of an agency by 
encouraging people to ignore its proce-
dures. Id. 
Although exhaustion of administrative remedies is a 
necessary and well established doctrine in the jurisprudence of 
administrative law, it is not absolute. Like any rule it is 
subject to certain exceptions. The administrative agency may 
be bypassed where the issue is one of constitutionality. 
Sandia Savings and Loan Assn. v. Kleinheim, 391 P.2d 324 (N. M. 
1964). Exhaustion of administrative remedies may also be 
avoided when the agency lacks jurisdiction to hear the case. 
State of Alaska Dept. of Labor, Wage and Hours Div. v. Alaska, 
664 P.2d 575 (Alaska, 1983). The doctrine may not apply when 
the statute authorizing the administrative remedy provides that 
the remedy is permissive only and not exclusive of the judicial 
remedy. Farmers Investment Company v. Arizona State Land 
Dept., 666 P.2d 469 (Ariz. App. 1982). Finally, exhaustion is 
not required when to do so would involve irreparable injury. 
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Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, Vol. Ill, 1958, §28.01 and 
§20.08. 
A review of the record in this case shows that none 
of the exceptions apply. Plaintiff did not allege in its 
complaint any constitutional issue, nor did it assert that 
jurisdiction was lacking at the administrative agency level. 
The plain language of the statutes involved direct the conclu-
sion that once a matter is pending in the administrative level, 
the administrative remedy is exclusive and not permissive in 
nature. Under established Utah Law, as discussed previously, 
the doctrine would apply. 
Although plaintiff initiated its action for the 
express purpose of obtaining a pre-judgment writ of attachment, 
a careful review of plaintiff's pleadings and the record shows 
that the likelihood of irreparable injury was non-existent. 
Plaintiff alleged in its complaint that defendant had committed 
fraud in obtaining public assistance, but dropped that claim at 
the outset of the trial. Plaintiff's witness Julia Bosley 
(identified in the transcript as Judy Bosley) testified that 
there was no evidence that defendant was intentionally trying 
to deceive anyone. (Transcript, at 80) At the hearing held on 
the writ of attachment before Judge Wahlquist, no evidence was 
presented to establish that defendant intended to defraud her 
creditors. (R. 8) The entry in the record for October 21, 
1985 shows that no testimony or affidavits were presented by 
plaintiff in support of its petition for an extraordinary writ. 
Therefore, the only basis for issuance of the writ was 
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plaintifffs verified complaint. The complaint contains no 
averments of personal knowledge by the person verifying it 
which showed that defendant was about to defraud any creditors. 
Further, testimony at the date of trial showed that the amount 
of money paid into the First District Court had not been 
touched, even though defendant had the right to do so. (Tran-
script, at 147-48). 
The issuance of a pre-judgment writ of attachment is 
a severe and harsh remedy and must be strictly construed. 
Deseret Bank of Salt Lake City v. Little, Roundy and Company, 
44 P. 930 (Ut. 1896). The facts proffered by plaintiff were 
insufficient to show a strong likelihood of irreparable injury 
and, for that reason, the writ should not have been granted. 
In view of the sound reasoning behind the exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies doctrine, compliance with the statute should 
not have been excused in this case. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN 
OF PROOF IN ESTABLISHING THE AMOUNT 
OF OVERPAYMENT ALLEGED OWING BY 
DEFENDANT. 
In its complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant 
was overpaid the following amounts: 
A- GA financial: $ 80.00 
B. Food Stamps: 1,166.00 
C. .Medical: 131.88 
TOTAL $1,377.88 
As to the amount of overpayment claimed, plaintiff had the 
burden of proving this aspect of its case by a preponderance of 
the evidence. To meet its burden, plaintiff offered the 
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testimony of Julia Bosley, a case supervisor at the Ogden 
Office of Community Operations. Ms. Bosley testified that she 
had been the case supervisor in the Brigham City office at the 
time defendant was determined by ORS to be ineligible for 
public assistance. (Transcript, at 56) Plaintiff then intro-
duced as evidence exhibits P-4 (R 117-18), P-5 (R 116) and P-6, 
(R 115). Through the testimony of Ms. Bosley, plaintiff 
established that the exhibits represented overpayment determi-
nations prepared by persons employed in the district office. 
Ms. Bosley testified that she herself had not prepared the 
overpayment determinations and had no personal knowledge of the 
information included therein. (Transcript, at 81-82) Ms. 
Bosley testified she had not compared the entries on the 
exhibits with the case file, but had simply checked the calcu-
lations. (Transcript, at 83) On the morning of trial she 
compared the exhibits with a microfiche prepared in Salt Lake, 
but did not know whether the figures were accurate. (Tran-
script, at 89). She stated she had no personal knowledge as to 
whether the amounts of assistance claimed were actually issued 
to defendant. (Transcript, at 84) She testified that the 
actual checks would be in the archives in Salt Lake and that 
ORS had access to them. (Transcript, at 84). As to the Food 
Stamps, Bosley testified she compared the figures with a 
payroll prepared in Salt Lake. (Transcript, at 85) She 
testified she had no way of knowing how much medical assistance 
had been provided, did not know whether the figures were 
correct and had not compared the figures with actual invoices. 
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(Transcript, at 86-87) Plaintiff did not present evidence of 
the actual public assistance checks issued to defendant, 
evidence of Food Stamp coupons having been issued to defendant, 
or invoices of medical services having been performed on 
defendant's behalf. 
At the close of plaintiff's case, defendant made a 
motion pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 41(b) that 
plaintiff's case be dismissed based on an insufficiency of 
evidence establishing the amount of overpayment. This motion 
was denied by Judge Hyde. 
The cited rule permits a court trying a case without 
a jury to grant a motion to dismiss when it concludes "that 
upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to 
relief," Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Company, 711 P.2d 250 
252 (Ut. 1985). The trial court is not precluded from granting 
such a motion even though the plaintiff has made out a prima 
facie case. Id. The court has stated concerning the rule: 
"The purpose of the rule is to permit the 
judge, as the fact finder, 'to weigh the 
evidence, to draw inferences therefrom, and 
if it finds the evidence insufficient to 
make out a case for the plaintiff, to 
render a decision for the defendant on the 
merits." Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping 
Company, supra, at 252. 
In this case, the trial judge erred in not dismissing 
plaintiff's case. Plaintiff had the burden of proving the 
amounts of public assistance provided. The evidence upon which 
plaintiff sought to establish the amounts was incompetent, 
since the exhibits represented summaries of information pre-
pared by persons not present at the trial. The testimony of 
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Ms. Bosley was incompetent, since she herself had not prepared 
the exhibits and had no personal knowledge of their content. 
Amounts such as those sought to be recovered by plaintiff must 
be ascertained in some manner other than speculation, conjec-
- ~ture or surmise. Great Western Motor Vehicles, Inc. v. L. C. 
Cozard, 417 P.2d 575, 578 (OK. 1966). At least one court has 
held that the failure by a state social services department to 
introduce substantial evidence (a renter's refund check) in an 
arrearage recovery case warranted denied of the claim. Engman 
v. AFSD, 677 P.2d 719 (Or. App. 1984). Since plaintiff 
introduced insufficient evidence in this case, it failed to 
meet its burden of proof and its case should have been 
dismissed. 
POINT III. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF 
LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE ONE-HALF EQUITY 
INTEREST WAS AVAILABLE TO DEFENDANT. 
The key issue considered at the trial was whether the 
equity interest which defendant held in joint tenancy with her 
ex-husband during the relevant time period constituted an 
available resource, thereby disqualifying her from financial 
assistance, medical assistance and Food Stamps. It was estab-
lished that defendant was issued general assistance in the 
amount of $80.00. The asset standards for the GA Program are 
found in APA Vol. II §810.4 and are based on the regulations 
governing the Aid to Families of Defendent Children (AFDC) 
program. On this issue, the AFDC regulations provide, in part: 
Only assets actually available to an 
individual shall be considered in estab-
lishing eligibility. APA Vol. II §400 
(Appendix "0") 
- 26 -
Ms. Bosley was incompetent, since she herself had not prepared 
the exhibits and had no personal knowledge of their content. 
Amounts such as those sought to be recovered by plaintiff must 
be ascertained in some manner other than speculation, conjec-
ture or surmise. Madewell v. Page, 417 P.2d 575, 578 (OK. 
1966). At least one court has held that the failure by a state 
social services department to introduce substantial evidence (a 
renter's refund check) in an arrearage recovery case warranted 
denial of the claim. Engman v. AFSD, 677 P.2d 719 (Or. App. 
1984). Since plaintiff introduced insufficient evidence in 
this case, it failed to meet its burden of proof and its case 
should have been dismissed. 
POINT III. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF 
LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE ONE-HALF EQUITY 
INTEREST WAS AVAILABLE TO DEFENDANT. 
The key issue considered at the trial was whether the 
equity interest which defendant held in joint tenancy with her 
ex-husband during the relevant time period constituted an 
available resource, thereby disqualifying her from financial 
assistance, medical assistance and Food Stamps. It was estab-
lished that defendant was issued general assistance in the 
amount of $80.00. The asset standards for the GA Program are 
found in APA Vol. II §810.4 and are based on the regulations 
governing the Aid to Families of Defendent Children (AFDC) 
program. On this issue, the AFDC regulations provide, in part: 
Only assets actually available to an 
individual shall be considered in estab-
lishing eligibility. APA Vol. II §400 
(Appendix "O") 
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The federal regulations upon which the state regulations are 
based state, in somewhat greater detail: 
To the extent not inconsistent with any 
other provision of this chapter, income and 
resources are considered available both 
when actually available and when the 
applicant or recipient has a legal interest 
in a liquidated sum and has the legal 
ability to make such sum available for 
support and maintenance. 45 C.F.R. Sec. 
233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) (Appendix "P") 
As to the meaning of "liquidated sum/1 the regulations provide: 
liquid assets are those properties in the 
form of cash or other financial instruments 
which are convertible to cash and include 
savings accounts, checking accounts, 
stocks, bonds, mutual fund shares, promis-
sory notes, mortgages, cash value of 
insurance policies, and similar properties. 
45 C.F.R. §233.20(a)(3)(ii)(F)(4) (Appendix 
"P") 
The state and federal regulations governing the food 
stamp program provide that only those resources to which a 
recipient actually has access should be counted as resources 
for Food Stamp purposes. APA Vol. IV Sec. 404 (Appendix "Q") 
defines what items are to be considered as a household's 
resources. These definitions include both liquid and 
rion-liquid resources and nearly mirror the federal regulations 
(7 C.F.R. §273.8(c)) (Appendix "R"). However, the "actually 
available11 provision for Food Stamp purposes is found in the 
provisions for resource exclusions. APA Vol. IV §406-8 (Appen-
dix "Q") provides, in relevant part, that, 
Resources whose cash value is not accessi-
ble to the household, such as but not 
limited to, irrevocable trust funds, 
security deposit's on rental property or 
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utilities, property in probate, and real 
property which the household is making a 
good faith effort to sell at a reasonable 
price and which has not been sold [are 
exempt]. 
The federal regulation at 7 C.F.R. §273.8(d)(8) 
(Appendix "R") provides, in relevant part, that the following 
are excluded from resources: 
Resources having a cash value which is not 
accessible to the household, such as but 
not limited to, irrevocable trust funds, 
security deposits on rental property or 
utilities, property in probate, and real 
property which the household is making a 
good faith effort to sell at a reasonable 
price and which has not been sold* The 
State agency may verify that the property 
is for sale and that the household has not 
declined a reasonable offer. Verification 
may be obtained through a collateral 
contact or documentation, such as an 
advertisement for public sale in a newspa-
per of general circulation or a listing 
with a real estate broker. 
The asset standards for the Indigent Medical Program 
are specified in APA Vol. Ill §807 et. seq. Section 807 pro-
vides, in relevant part, that "Assets are to be considered as 
anything of value that is accessible to the individual." 
(Appendix "S")• 
The meaning of the term "actually available" has been 
scrutinized by federal and state courts in a long line of 
cases. The seminal case in this inquiry is King v. Smith, 392 
U.S. 309, 88 §. Ct. 2128, 20 L. Ed. 2d. 1118 (1967) wherein the 
Court held that the income of an able-bodied man with whom a 
mother cohabited could not be counted as available income. 
Similarly, in Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552, 90 S. Ct. 1282, 25 
L. Ed. 2d. 561 (1970) the Court held that support from a 
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non-adoptive stepfather (man assuming the role of spouse) could 
not be considered actually available to the mother's children. 
Since the Supreme Court's decisions in King and 
Lewis, federal courts have reviewed and struck down many state 
schemes for counting as available income that which was not 
actually available, including: John v. Harder, 383 F. Supp. 
174 (D. Conn. 1974), afffd per curiam, 512 F. 2d 1188 (2d. Cir. 
1975) (surplus OASDI benefits not held available to an AFDC 
family); National Welfare Rights Organization v. Weinberger, 
377 F. Supp. 861 (D.D.C. 1974) (income reduced by the recovery 
of an overpayment held to not actually be available); Green v. 
Barnes, 485 F. 2d 242, 244 (10th Cir. 1973) (encumbrance on a 
home resulted in a portion of a resource being considered not 
actually available); Owens v. Heckler, 753 F. 2d 675 (8th Cir. 
198 5) (benefits received by AFDC caretaker relative actually 
needed for educational expenses were excludable from income 
available to AFDC applicant); Hayes v. City University of New 
York, 503 F. Supp. 946 (S.D. New York 1980) (federal education-
al assistance for student's current living costs could not be 
treated as available income); Granito v. Sunn, 594 F. Supp. 410 
(D. Haw. 1984) (lump sum income already spent not considered 
available for Medicaid eligibility purposes); and Hein v. 
Burns, 402 F. Supp. 398 (S.D. la. CD. 1975) (travel allowances 
received under a federal education and training plan excludable 
from resources under the Food Stamp Act). 
Courts which have considered the meaning of "actually 
available" have done so with careful attention to the highly 
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specialized context in which the term is used. Thus, the Court 
in Wilczynski v. Harder, 323 F. Supp. 509, 517 (D. Conn. 1971) 
summarized: 
Reasonable evaluation of available assets 
in the context of eligibility for public 
assistance must have reference to evalua-
tion for purposes of meeting those present 
needs for which assistance would otherwise 
be provided. To be available, resources 
must be fin-handf or 'under the control of 
the individual'. Any other measurement of 
value,...is irrelevant to whether a recipi-
ent can meet out of his own assets his 
present subsistence needs. 
A number of state courts have considered whether 
certain assets in the context of public assistance eligibility 
were actually available. In Warlick v. Public Welfare Divi-
sion, 562 P. 2d. 223 (Or. App. 1977) the court held that 
support monies owing to an AFDC recipient did not constitute 
liquidated sums of money and were not available income to her 
until actually paid to her. Thus, the court held that amounts 
received by the state in May, but not transmitted to the 
recipient until June were income in June for purposes of 
determining eligibility. In Russell v. N.M. Human Services 
Dept., 653 P. 2d 1224 (N.M. 1982) the Court held that an AFDC 
recipient did not have access to the proceeds from the sale of 
her home when it was transferred to pay debts to family members 
who had assisted her. In Frazier v. N.tA. Dept. of Human 
» 
Services, 645 P. 2d 454 (N.M. 1982) the Court held a real 
estate contract to be not actually available since it was not 
readily negotiable. In Idaho Falls Consol. Hosp. v. Bd. of 
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Commissioners, 712 P.2d 582 (Id. 1985) equity in a home below 
the homestead exemption was not considered actually available. 
When the findings of fact established by the district 
court are considered in the light of the aforecited relevant 
case law, it may properly be concluded that the equity interest 
in the home at issue in the trial was not "actually available" 
to defendant until the money was paid by her husband into the 
First District Court. The transcript of the trial shows that 
the evaluation of the equity in the home was a matter of 
serious dispute between defendant and her husband for a lengthy 
period of time. It must also be borne in mind that the rele-
vant time period for consideration of the asset being available 
is from May, 1983 until November, 1984. The transcript shows 
that during this time a real question existed in defendant's 
mind as to the reasonable valuation of the property. Defendant 
sought to resolve that question through further court proceed-
ings which culminated shortly before her trial. Even at the 
day of trial, defendant was not certain whether her right of 
appeal had been finally extinguished. (Transcript, at 147-48) 
It was only after a lengthy court proceeding that the fair 
market value of the equity interest was determined and that 
amount paid into the First District Court. 
The facts established in defendant's case are compa-
» 
rable to those in Warlick and a similar result should follow. 
Although defendant had some legal interest in the equity 
interest it was not actually paid to her and received until 
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after the relevant period. Under the cited authority, it was 
only then that the asset was actually available. 
The transcript of the trial further shows that 
defendant was not a person who set out to intentionally deceive 
the state in regard to public assistance. (Transcript, at 80) 
She was a recently divorced woman, suffering from injuries and 
unable to work (Transcript, at 139), unfamiliar with the 
Welfare system and suffering emotional disturbance which caused 
her to seek mental health counseling. (Transcript, at 140-41) 
She sought public assistance, primarily Food Stamps, because 
she had limited income, no vocational skills and was unable to 
support herself. The testimony showed that the application 
which she completed in order to receive public assistance did 
not clearly advise her that an equity interest in a home 
subject to legal dispute should be counted as an asset. 
(Transcript, at 9) Furthermore, the state's own employees in 
the Brigham City district office did not inform her of the 
full meaning of the questions on the application form. (Tran-
script, at 91) 
The federal Food Stamp Act, and arguably the state 
Welfare Act as well, is remedial in nature and, therefore, 
entitled to a broad construction consistent with its purpose. 
Hein v. Burns, supra, at 404. That purpose is to safeguard the 
» 
health and well-being of U.S. citizens and to raise their level 
of nutrition. Id., at 404. There is no question that defen-
dant was in need of Food Stamps and the other forms of public 
assistance when she applied for them. In view of this fact, a 
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broad construction should be given to the meaning of the term, 
"actually available"• Given defendant's circumstances the 
Court may properly conclude that the resource in question was 
not actually available. 
POINT IV 
THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE CORRECTED TO DENY 
PLAINTIFF 
IS NOT 
ATTORNEY 
SUPPORTED BY 
FEES 
ANY 
SINCE THIS 
EVIDENCE IN 
CLAIM 
THE 
RECORD 
In its complaint, plaintiff prayed for attorney fees 
pursuant to U.C.A. §55-15a-24(7). Plaintiff introduced no 
evidence as to the reasonableness of any attorney fees during 
the presentation of its case. After the plaintiff had rested 
its case, and after the matter had been submitted to the court, 
plaintiff's counsel first raised the issue of attorney fees. 
As the record reflects (R-88), plaintiff's counsel was permit-
ted to take the stand and testify concerning attorney fees. 
However, the transcript of the hearing contains no record of 
any testimony concerning attorney fees. 
Utah law is clear that a judgment, including one for 
attorney fees, must be based upon evidence in the record. FMA 
Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc., 404 P.2d 670, 673 (Ut. 
1965). In this case, the Court stated: 
Failing to offer proof of any character on 
this issue had the same effect as would the 
failure to offer proof as to any other 
controverted issue. There is nothing upon 
which to base a finding. The defendant's 
objection that the finding as to attorney 
fees is not supported by any evidence is 
well taken and the judgment must be cor-
rected in that particular. Id., at 674. 
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Based upon the lack of evidence supporting a claim for attor-
neys fees, it should be concluded that plaintiff has failed to 
carry its burden of proof on that issue and the judgment 
corrected accordingly. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DATED this /& day of March, 1987. 
^7u^^'^S^w 
MICHAEL E. BULSON 
Attorney for Appellant-Defendant 
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DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
MICHAEL D. SMITH 
Assistant Attorney General 
Chief, Civil Enforcement Division 
ROBERT D. BARCLAY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Plaintff 
2540 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 626-3512 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, Department of Social 
Services, Office of Recovery Services, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BETTY A. WHITAKER, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 93725 
The above matter came on regularly for trial on the 2nd day of 
October, 1986, before the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, sitting without a jury. 
Robert D. Barclay, Assistant Attorney General, represented the plaintiff. 
The defendant was present and represented by Michael Bulson, Utah Legal 
Services. Witnesses were sworn and testified and the parties argued their 
respective positions, whereupon the court took the matter under advisement. 
Having rendered its written Memorandum Decision, and made its separate 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED that the plaintiff do have and 
recover judgment against the defendant as follows: 
$1,407.88 Principal 
77.50 Costs 
500.00 Attorney's fees 
Appendix 
$1,985.38 TOTAL JUDGMENT
 P a g e 1 O 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 93725 
Page 2 
together with interest thereon at the rate of 121 from the date herein until 
it is paid in full. 
DATED this day of October, 1986. 
RONALD 0. HYDE, District Judge 
0879D 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, Department of 
Social Services, Office 
of Recovery Services, 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
BETTY A- WHITAKER, 
Defendant. 
i MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 93725 
This action was filed against defendant to recover 
alleged overpayments of public benefits paid during the time 
period of June, 1983, through October, 1984. Plaintiff alleges 
overpayment was incurred because defendant failed to report 
correct and complete information to plaintiff which would have 
affected her eligibility for benefits. 
In her divorce decree, the home, which was owned in 
joint tenancy, was ordered sold at fair market value and each of 
the parties would receive one-half of the net proceeds after 
deduction of all mortgages, commissions, closing costs, etc. 
Following the entry of the decree, a subsequent hearing a stipu-
lation was entered into providing that either party could 
purchase the home. The defendant husband offered to pay her 
$20,000 for her interest, which she would not accept. She claims 
Appendix "B" 
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Memorandum Decision 
Case No. 93725 
her basis for non-acceptance was that the property was worth 
more, because a real estate agent had told her it was worth 
more. As a factual matter, when it was finally forcibly sold by 
Court order, it was worth less. The true fact appears to be that 
she did not want to sell the home under any circumstances, as she 
was hoping for a reconciliation with her husband. 
I hold that the money was actually available, all she 
would have had to do was to say she would take it, and he would 
have had the funds within four to five days. I further hold that 
her refusal to accept it was unreasonable, and does to this day 
remain unreasonable. She has almost $17,000 held in the Clerk's 
Office in Box Elder County, which to this day she has not picked 
up. Defendant did fail to report correct and complete informa-
tion in regard to the home. 
Defendant further claims that the home was in litiga-
tion, which was not so. Even though she disputed the amount 
unreasonably and made no effort to have it appraised and deter-
mine a correct amount, her interest was not in litigation. Her 
interest was set; it was one-half the equity; her ex-husband was 
ready, willing and able to pay it to her at any time. 
I hold that the defendant received public assistance 
benefits that she was not entitled to, and was accordingly 
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Memorandum Decision 
Case No. 93725 
overpaid. Judgment to the plaintiff: $1,407.88, plus costs, and 
$500.00 attorney's fees. Plaintiff's attorney to prepare 
findings, conclusions and judgment in accordance herewith. 
DATED this / ^  day of October, 1986. 
Ijn2*&6^ 
RONALD O. HYDE, Ju 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this li day of October, 1986, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision was 
served upon the following: 
Robert D. Barclay 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
533 26th Street, Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Mike Bulson 
Attorney for Defendant 
385 24th Street, Suite 522 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
X
 l-XW\ 
PAULA CARR, Secretary 
Appendix "B" 
Page 3 of 3 
kfaoAfirs COPY 
Robert p. Barclay 
Deputy Weber County Attorney 
533 - 26th Streetf Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-2354 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 03URT OF WEBER GOUNTOY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAHf Department of 
Social Services, Office of 
Recovery Services
 f 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BETTY A* WHITAKER, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND NOTICE 
OF HEARING 
Civil No. 9 3 7 2 ^ 
O R D E R 
TO THE CLERK OF THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT: 
Upon consideration of the Verified Complaint filed in this matter and 
finding that funds (approximately $17,574.3 9) have beenf or shortly shall bef 
paid to the First District Court Qerkf in Civil Case No. 16570f on behalf of 
Betty A. Whitaker by Uqyd Whitaker; that the clerk would immediately forward 
said funds to the defendant subject to an attorney's lien of record; and that 
the defendant would thereafter dispose of said funds, thereby causing the 
plaintiff to suffer irreparable injury, loss and damage in that the defendant 
will not then have a fund from which the entire debt due to the plaintiff 
herein can be paid. 
IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff is awarded an order of pre-judgment 
attachment or garnishment. Accordingly, the First District Court CLerk shall 
retain the sum of $2f500.00 from any funds presently held by or hereafter paid 
to the CLerk on behalf of Betty A. Whitaker and hold the same pending further 
it n ii 
/ / < y/\( 5T Appendix "C 
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Order and Notice of Hearing 
Betty A. Whitaker 
order regarding the disbursement of the $2,500,00. The balance of any funds 
may be paid to the defendant and her former attorney, Randine Salerno, 
pursuant to the attorney's lien on record with the Clerk. 
IT IS FOKIHER ORDERED that this order shall expire ten (10) days from 
the date and time it is issued unless (a) otherwise terminated at an earlier 
date, or (b) continued by further order of the court after hearing. 
DftTED this / n day of October, 1985, at X :3£b'clock p.m. 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO THE ffiOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT: 
Please take notice that hearing on the issuance and continuance of 
the foregoing order shall cone before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, 6th 
Floor, south side, Municipal Building, Ogden, Utah, at 9:00 a.nu on Monday, 
October 21, 1985. 
! $ DATED th is fr- day of October, 1985. 
ROBERT D. BARCLAY f 
Deputy Weber County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
STATE OF UTAH ] 
c£wm OF
 W£3,R i 5£tt f ss: 
\ HEFr-^ ^ 
CF ~:-'-fc^ 
PAJcu r 
Copy 
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Robert D. Barclay 
Deputy Weber County Attorney
 r -•-. * -- ~
v
- ^ 5 n 
533 - 26th Street, Suite 200 > '~T - p i / 
Ogden, Utah 84401 V1 
Telephone: 621-2354 ,•: ^  
IN TOE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT (XXJRT OP WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, Department of 
Social Services, Office of 
Recovery Services, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BETTY A. WHITAKER, 
Defendant* 
O R D E R 
Civil No. 93725 
On October 16, 1985, the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde signed an Order 
whereby the First District Court Qerk was ordered to retain the sum of 
$2,500.00 from any funds presently held by or thereafter paid to the said 
Qerk on behalf of Betty A. Whitaker. Said Order was to have expired ten (10) 
days from the date and time it was issued, unless terminated at an earlier 
date or continued by further order of the above court after hearing. 
On October 21, 1985, the matter came before the Honorable John F. 
Wahlquist for hearing. Robert D. Barclay, Deputy Weber County Attorney, 
represented the plaintiff. The defendant was present and was represented by 
Curtis L. Child, Utah Legal Services, Inc. After hearing the statements and 
arguments of the parties, the court denied the defendant's objections to the 
continuance of the Order and ruled that if the plaintiff filed an undertaking 
in double the amount being retained, before 5:00 p.m., the order could be 
continued until a complete resolution of the claiined debt has been made. At 
3:56 p.m., the plaintiff filed an undertaking in the amount of $5,000.00. 
Now, therefore, 
IT IS ORDERED that the above-referenced Order signed by Judge Hyde 
Anpendix "D" 
Page 1 of 3 
Page 2 
Order, Civil #93725 
Betty A* Whitaker 
on October 16, 1985, is continued and shall remain in full force and effect 
until a final adjudication h*s been made on plaintiff's claim against the 
defendant. Accordingly, the First District Court Clerk is ordered to continue 
to retain the sum of $2,500.00 from any funds presently held by or hereafter 
paid to the said Clerk on behalf of Betty A. Whitaker until (a) the plaintiff 
obtains a judgment against the defendant and the Court further orders that the 
money be released to the plaintiff in payment of such judgment, or (b) the 
defendant obtains an order that plaintiff is not entitled to the alleged 
judgment and the Court further orders that the money be released to the 
defendant. 
DATED this ^ "7 day of October, 1985, without being first submitted 
as a proposed order since time is of the essence in notifying the First 
District Court CLerk that the Order is continued; the defendant is reserved 
the opportunity to request changes in the form of the Order should the same be 
7 
warranted. 
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Order, Civil #93725 
Betty A. Whitaker 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order to the Attorney for the Plaintiff, Curt Childf Utah Legal 
Services, Inc.f 385 - 24th Street, Suite 522, Ogden, Utah 84401, on this 
day of October, 1985. 
Secretary 
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Volume I I I 5-b3 
Hearings and Legal 
Proceedings 
BUREAU OF GENERAL COLLECTIONS 
200 General Introduction 
Due to the nature of ORS collection programs, the assistance of 
the legal system is often sought. In many cases civil or criminal 
proceedings may be initiated to enforce collection and to act as a 
deterrence to continued program fraud and abuse. 
In addition, federal regulations require states to provide an 
administrative hearing process in several programs administered by 
the Bureau of General Collections. 
The objective of this section is to outline the procedures for the 
administrative hearing processes and for pursuing civil/criminal 
actions. 
201 Fair Hearings 
With regards to ORS programs, the fa i r hearing process applies to 
the Financial Overpayment, Medical Overpayment, Food Stamp 
Overpayment, and Support Fraud Programs: 
1. The availability of a fa i r hearing is provided for in APA 
Volume I I , I I I , and IV pertaining to financial, medical, and 
food stamp assistance programs administered by the Utah 
State Department of Social Services. The policy pertaining 
to fa i r hearings stated in APA Volume I I , I I I , and IV also 
applies to ORS. 
2. An obligor may request a fa i r hearing to: 
a. Contest that a financial, medical, or food stamp 
overpayment exists. 
b. Contest the amount of the overpayment!s). 
c. Contest the amount of the grant reduction or food 
stamp allotment reduction. 
2. All requests for fa i r hearings must be made within 90 days 
of the effective date of agency action. 
ex. 1 In the case of a food stamp claim an obligor wno is 
not receiving benefits must request a fa i r hearing 
w,1thin yO days from the date of the in i t ia l demand 
letter from ORS. 
2U1.1 When an obligor/recipient disagrees with the agency's action, the 
investigator or e l ig ib i l i ty worker shall explain the regulations 
on which the action was based and attempt to resolve the issue. 
The obligor/recipient should be asked i f they would l ike to have 
an agency conference to resolve the issue. I f the obligor/ 
recipient wants a fa i r hearing, the individual shall be provided 
with a form 490, Request for Fair Hearing. The investigator or 
e l ig ib i l i ty worker shall not l imit or interfer with the 
individual's right to request a fair hearing. Appendix 
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Hearings and Legal 
Proceedings 
202 Fair Hearing Scheduled 
1. The hearing officer must notify the obligor/recipient, the 
distr ict off ice, and the ORS investigative team of the time, 
date, and place of the hearing, and the issue to be heard. 
This notice must be mailed at least ten days prior to the 
date of the hearing unless al l parties agree to an earlier 
date. 
202.1 Attempt to Resolve Issue 
I f the hearing issue is resolved prior to the date of the hearing, 
the hearing officer shall be notified by a let ter signed by the 
obligor, his/her representative, or the ORS or Field Service 
representative. 
202.3 The team supervisor or a designated investigator wil l prepare for 
the hearing and will coordinate with the designated APA 
representative. 
1 . Both representatives w i l l be responsible for presenting the 
department's case during the course of the hearing. 
2. The F ie ld Service representative w i l l address the issue of 
the va l id i ty of the overpayment and the amount. The ORS 
representative w i l l address the issue of the amount of the 
grant reduction, i f one has been init iated. I t is not 
necessary for an ORS representative to be present i f the 
only issue to be heard is the validity and amount of the 
overpayment; however, i t is advisable. 
202.4 Fair Hearing Not Open to Public 
Only the hearing o f f icer , representatives and witnesses of APA and 
ORS, the obl igor / recip ient , his representative and witnesses may 
be present a t the f a i r hearing. 
202.5 Procedure During Fair Hearing 
1. The hearing shall be conducted informally by the hearing 
o f f icer . A statement of the problem by the hearing o f f i c e r , 
a statement by the Fie ld Service/ORS representatives and a 
statement by the obligor shall be made. 
2. Pertinent evidence shall be presented by a l l part ies. 
a. An obligor and/or her representative shall have access 
to case data which w i l l be used as evidence in the 
hearing in accordance with ORS Volume I I I section 105. 
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Hearings and Legal 
Proceedings 
3. The obligor shall have the opportunity to advance any 
arquments without undue interference and to examine, 
question or refute any testimony or evidence, including the 
opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses. 
4. The decision shall not be based on hearsay evidence alone. 
In addition to hearsay evidence, the distr ict office must 
have at least one of the following: 
a. A person or persons willingness to testify at a 
hearing. 
b. A signed statement by an individual. 
c. Worker's personal knowledge regarding the situation. 
d. Documents verifying the facts pertinent to the case. 
202.6 Fair Hearing Decision 
1. After the fa i r hearing, the hearing officer shall issue a 
written decision stating; 
a. The evidence presented at the hearing. 
b. Findings of fact supported by a preponderance of the 
evidence on record. 
c. Applicable laws and regulations upon which the 
decision was based. 
d. The obligor's right to appeal the decision and 
possible e l ig ib i l i ty for free legal assistance. 
e. Mo Fair Hearing Decision shall rest on hearsay 
evidence alone. 
202.61 The decision wil l be* issued within 60 days of tne date of 
the hearing request unless the obligor presents reasonable 
cause for a delay. 
202.7 Hearing Communications 
Copies of any written communication init iated by the Department of 
Social Services during the decision making process, shall be sent 
to the obligor and his representative. The obligor shall be 
allowed five working days to submit written rebuttal testimony. 
1. I f any additional factual evidence is submitted as a result 
of such communication, the entire proceeding shall be 
remanded to the hearing officer where the claimant and his 
authorized representative shall be given a reasonable 
opportunity to examine, confront and cross-examine such 
witnesses or evidence. 
202.8 Written Notice of Hearing Decision 
Copies of the Hearing Decision shall oe mailed to the executive 
director of the Department of Social Services, the State APA 
Office and Field Service District Office, the ORS District Office, 
the obligor and her authorized representative. 
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1. The hearing officer shall make a record of the hearing 
request, the findings of fact, and the hearing decision. 
This record shall be maintained in the office of the hearing 
officer and shall be available to the APA ana ORS Office for 
review. 
202.9 Hearing Decisions are Binding 
Hearing decisions are binding on both state and distr ict offices. 
1. The distr ict office and the Office of Recovery Services, 
unless reversed by subsequent administrative approval or 
court order, shall comply with the hearing decision within 
ten days of the date the hearing decision is received. 
2. Within thirty days from the date of the hearing decision, 
the distr ict director of APA shall review the case to assure 
the distr ict office and.the Office of Recovery Services has 
complied with the hearing decision. 
3. I f the hearing decision indicates a statewide misapplication 
of policy, a corrective action evalution wi l l be made. 
202.10 Hearing Decision Summaries are Available to the Public 
. Summaries of Hearing Decisions shall be made available to the 
public, APA, Field Service District Offices, and ORS without 
violating instructions regarding the safeguarding of information. 
2U2.11 Right of Appeal 
1. The obligor shall have the right to appeal a hearing 
decision through the director of Administrative Hearings. 
a. The request for a review of the decision must be made 
in writing within 20 days of the date the obligor 
receives the hearing decision. 
b. The director shall render a final departmental 
decision on the issues raised within H days of the 
date the request is received. 
c. Any further appeals of the decision by the claimant or 
the department shall be made through the legal process. 
2. An administrative hearing decision does not prohibit the 
agency from init iating a c iv i l or criminal action in a court 
of appropriate jurisdiction. 
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203 Contested Overpayment 
If a fa ir hearing i s requested to contest the amount of the 
overpayment but not that an overpayment e x i s t s , the Dis tr ic t APA 
Office shall continue issuing the corrected grant minus the grant 
reduction. 
If a fa i r hearing i s requested to contest the determination that 
an overpayment e x i s t s or the amount of the grant reduction or 
allotment reduction, the d i s t r i c t o f f i ce must reinstate the 
original grant or food stamp benefits until a hearing decision i s 
rendered. 
An overpayment resulting from assistance issued until a hearing 
decision i s rendered shall be recovered i f the decision of the 
hearing supports the d i s t r i c t action. 
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240 Administrative Process for Overpayments 
The purpose of this procedure is to establish an overpayment 
obligation and to determine the cause of an overpayment through 
the use of an administrative process and hearing procedure when 
there is no prior court order. 
Upon the determination that an overpayment was incurred or upon 
default by the obligor, an order shall be issued. This order 
shall be docketed in the court of appropriate jurisdiction and 
shall be enforceable by law. 
If the case involves a food stamp claim and a determination is 
made by a hearing officer that the claim was incurred due to 
intentional program violation, the individual shall be 
disqualified in accordance with appropriate Federal Regulation. 
240.1 Legal Authority 
Authority to establish overpayment obligations and to determine 
the cause of the overpayment by administrative procedure i s found 
in Section 55-15e-l, e t seq. Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
240.2 Authority of the Department 
The department through i t ' s director or his designee may 
administer oaths, certify off icial acts , issue subpoenas, and 
compel witnesses and the production of business records, 
documents, and evidence. 
240.3 Attorneys Fees and Court Costs 
Except when an overpayment i s due to an administrative error, ORS 
may recover reasonable attorney fees and costs from the obligor 
incurred in pursuing administrative remedies. 
240.4 Interest 
Except when an overpayment is due to administrative error, the 
department may recover interest at a rate not to exceed 1% per 
month or 12% per annum on the amount due as stated in the default 
or hearing order. The interest shall begin to accrue from the 
date the order is issued. This is in addition to interest which 
shall accrue on all amounts not paid to the department from the 
time the obligation is discovered, at the rate of 8% per annum. 
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241 Notice 
I f an obligor is not subject to a current court order, send form 
743.1, Notice of Overpayment Determination and form 743.2, Notice 
of Informal Settlement Conference. Form 743.1 gives the obligor 
three alternatives within 30 days from date of service: 
1. Pay the entire debt in fu l l . 
2. Attend an informal conference with an investigator 
3. Request a formal hearing. 
241.1 Service of Notice 
Service of the Notice of Determination of Overpayment shall be as 
follows: 
By certified mail, return receipt; or by a Sheriff of the 
county where the service is made, or by his deputy, or by 
any other person over the age of 21 years, and not a party 
to the action. 
By leaving a copy of such notice at his usual place of abode 
with some person of suitable age and discretion. 
Service of other papers shall be done in a manner pursuant to the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
241.2 Notice Packet 
The following forms should be included in the packet served on the 
obligor: 
1. Notice of Overpayment Determination, Form 743.1 
2. Notice of Informal Settlement Conference, Form 743.2 
3. Legal Rights/Written Answer, Form 826 
4. Income/Asset Affidavit 
241.3 Assessment/Settlement Conference 
The obligor may respond and attend a Settlement/ Assessment 
Conference. The purpose of the assessment conference is to: 
1. Make a final determination on the amount and cause of the 
overpayment liability. 
2. Obtain a stipulation and agreement to establish a judgment. 
3. Obtain a Food Stamp disqualification consent agreement/when 
appropriate. 
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241.4 Stipulation and Judgment and Order 
Upon completion of the conference and agreement by both parties, 
prepare a stipulation and judgment and order. The obligor shall 
sign the stipulation. 
If payment is not made in full, the order shall be entered. 
If monthly payment are negotiated, attempt to secure a wage 
assignment. Inform the obligor that his situation will be 
reviewed at a later date. Send the order to the ORS Docket Clerk 
who will docket the order and forward the abstract to the 
appropriate court. 
241.5 Food Stamp Claim 
If the obligation involves an alleged intentional program 
violation food stamp claim, the investigator must obtain a waiver 
or consent agreement to establish an intentional program 
violation. Inform the obligor that he will be disqualified from 
future participation in the food stamp program based on this 
determination in accordance with federal regulations. 
If the obligor refuses to sign a consent agreement or waiver the 
agency shall inform the obligor that either an administrative 
disqualification hearing will be initiate or will on criminal 
action may be filed in a court of appropriate jurisdiction to 
determine the cause of the overpayment. If either form determines 
that an intentional program violation has been committed the 
obligor will be disqualified from participation in the Food Stamp 
Program in accordance with federal regulation. 
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242 Failure to Respond 
If the obligor fails to respond to the department within 30 days 
from the date of service of notice on the obligor, the department 
may enter an administrative default order against the obligor. 
1. A disqualification may not be imposed if the judgment is 
obtained by default absent Findings of Facts by a hearing 
officer that an intentional program violation has accured 
(see Vol. Ill 256.1). 
242.1 Default Judgment and Order 
If the obligor fai ls to respond to the notice within 30 days; or 
if the obligor requests a formal hearing and fails to appear or, 
If the obligor fails to request a formal hearing on the matter, a 
default judgment and order shall be initiated. 
The default judgment shall be mailed to the obligor*s last known 
address by certified mail. 
242.2 Preparation of Default Judgment and Order 
1. Initiate form 747.1, Default Judgment and Order. 
2. The order must be accompanied by form 747.3, Affidavit of 
Default, and form 748.1, Abstract of Award. 
3. All forms shall be prepared in triplicate. 
4. A Notice of Administrative Order, letter 087.2, and a form 
826, Legal Rights/Written Answer, shall Be" prepared in 
duplicate and shall accompany the Default Judgment and Order 
sent to the obligor. 
These documents shall be arranged and forwarded to the Central 
Docket Clerk according to Section 260, Docket Procedures. 
242.4 Changes to the Computer (Reserved) 
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Adverse Action Hearing Request 
Any person adversely affected by an action of the department i s 
entitled to a hearing under this section, except in the following 
issues: 
1. The amount of grant reduction. 
2. The amount of assessed monthly payment. 
To obtain a hearing the person must f i l e a request in writing with 
either the Office of Recovery Services or the Office of 
Administrative Hearings within 30 days after the person receives 
notice of adverse action. 
Location of the Hearing 
The hearing shall be held in the person's county of residence or 
other place convenient to the person. 
The hearing shall 
examiner. 
be conducted by an administrative hearing 
1. The hearing shall 
is f i led. 
be held within 30 days after the request 
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250 Administrative Hearing to Determine Overpayment 
1. Any person adversely affected by an action of the department 
taken pursuant to Section 55-15e-l, et. seq. UCA, 1953, as 
amended, is entitled to a hearing. To obtain a hearing, the 
person must file a request in writing with either the Office 
of Recovery Services or the Office of Administrative 
Hearings. 
2. A written request must be received within 30 days after the 
person receives notification of adverse action. 
3. The hearing shall be conducted by an administrative hearing 
examiner. 
4. The hearing shall be conducted within 30 days from the date 
the request is filed. 
250.1 The obligor may not request a hearing to contest: 
1. A matter of eligibility. These issues are heard under the 
fair hearing procedures. 
2. The amount of grant reduction or allotment reduction. These 
issues are heard under fair hearing procedures. 
3. The amount of assessed monthly repayment amount. 
4. A prior court order. 
5. A prior administrative disqualification hearing. 
NOTE: Matters 4 and 5 must be addressed in the judicial forum. 
250.2 Location of Hearings 
1. The hearing shall be held in the obligor's county of 
residence or other place convenient to that person. With 
the consent of the party who has requested the hearing, the 
matter may be conducted by the use of a telephonic — 
conferencing process, consistent with procedures which have 
been promulgated by the Department in that regard. 
250.3 Representation 
1. The Department may be represented by the Attorney General's 
office or County Attorney upon request. 
2. An investigator or manager shall be present at all hearings 
to present evidence and act as a witness where necessary. 
3. The Administrative Hearing Clerk will notify the investi-
gator, the appropriate attorney and the obligor and the 
obligor's attorney or representative of the hearing date and 
time. 
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250.4 Agency Response to Administrative Hearing Request 
If the hearing request i s received by the Office of Recovery 
Services, i t shall be forwarded to the Office of Administrative 
Hearings within two days along with the following: 
1. The original or a copy of the form 743.1, Notice of 
Overpayment Determination. A Notice of Default should be 
attached if default i s the reason for the hearing. 
2. Proof of Service. 
3. An Affidavit of Default on all hearings regarding default 
orders. 
4. The Default order where applicable. 
5. The original hearing request. 
6. Form 827 , Administrative Hearing Check List. 
250.5 Case Preparation 
Use form 827 , Administrative Hearing Check List, as a guideline 
for preparing the case for the hearing. 
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any of its political subdivisions, if the office has 
contracted to provide collection services or has been 
ordered by a court or administrative authority to 
enforce collection; and 
(7) finance any costs incurred from collections. 19M 
55-15c-5. Department as real party In interest -
Written consent to payment agreements • 
Department's subrogation rights. 
(1) The department shall be deemed a real party 
in interest in any cause of action which the office is 
pursuing because" ^the department has provided 
public assistance. 
(2) N o agreement between an obligee and any 
obligor either relieving an obligation or purporting 
to settle past, present, or future obligations, either 
as settlement or prepayment, shall act to reduce or 
terminate any rights of the department to recover 
from that obligor for public assistance provided 
unless the department has consented to the agree-
ment in writing. 
;(3) Any court order embodying a money judgment 
to be paid to an obligee by any person shall be 
deemed in favor of the department to the extent of 
the amount of the department's subrogation rights. 
1979 
55-i5c-6. Director - Powers of office -
Confidential information from employers -
Legal representation - Receipt of grants or 
stipends - Rules and regulations. 
(1) The director of the office shall be appointed 
by the executive director of the department and 
covered under the merit system. 
(2) The office shall have power to administer 
oaths, to certify to official acts, issue subpoenas, 
compel witnesses and the production of books, 
accounts, documents, and evidence. 
(3) For purposes of this act, the office shall be 
entitled to information from both public and private 
employers regarding the name, address and social 
security number of employees. Such information 
shall be treated as confidential by the office, 
(4) It shall be the duty of the attorney general or 
the county attorney of any county in which a cause 
of action can be filed, to represent the office. 
(5) The office with department approval is auth-
orized to receive any grants or stipends from the 
federal government or other public or private source 
designed to aid the efficient and effective operation 
of t he recovery program. 
(6) The office is authorized to adopt and enforce 
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to 
carry out the provisions of this chapter. 1979 
55-15c-7. Parent locator unit and medicaid fraud 
unit designated criminal justice agencies. 
The state parent locator unit within the office of 
recovery services and the medicaid fraud unit are 
designated as criminal justice agencies for the sole 
purpose of requesting and obtaining access to cri-
minal justice information, subject to appropriate 
federal, state, and local agency restrictions gover-
ning the dissemination of such information. i9Sl 
55-15c-8. Collection of bail amounts - Writs of , 
garnishment or execution - Procedure. 
(1) When the office is ordered by a court to 
enforce collection of bail amounts, pursuant to 
Subsection 77-7-19(3), the office may issue a writ 
of garnishment or execution in the same manner, 
and with the same effe/ct as if the writ were issued 
on a judgment of a district court, after it has prov-
ided to the obligor no less than ten days written 
notice of intent to administratively enforce the bail 
amount. Notice shall be mailed by certified mail, 
return receipt requested, to the obligor's last known 
address on file with the United States Postal Service. 
(2) A writ of garnishment or execution issued 
under this section shall be signed by the director of 
the office or his designee, and served in accordance 
with rules of the department which meet the stand-
ards of due process, or according to Rule 4 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(3) The office shall deliver all collected bail 
amounts, less the cost of collection to the court 
which issued the warrant of arrest, in accordance 
with the provisions of Subsection 77-7-19(3). The 
office may reissue administrative writs of garnish-
ment or execution until the full bail amount referred 
to it for collection has been collected. 19M 
Chapter 15d, Medical Benefits Recovery 
A c t • " • • ' • • •• " ' * ' : • • ' • • 
55-15d-l through 55-15d-17. Repealed. 1981 
Chapter 15e. Administrative ;, 
Determination of Overpayments ; 
55-15e-l. Citation of chapter. 
55-15e-2. Definitions. 
55-15c-3. Obligor presumed to have received notice of 
department's rights - Adoption of regulations by 
department - Powers of department to administer I ' < 
chapter - Recovery of attorney's fees, costs and : r 
interests. 
55-15e-4. Determination of overpayment and 
fraudulently obtained benefits - Notice of determination 
- Service of notice - Default order. 
55-15e-5. Hearing - Location and time - Continuances
 r 
- Official record - Findings required - Default -
Service of findings Upon parties. ' ' 
55-15e-6. Judicial review - Procedure. 
55-15e-7. Order to show cause why previously entered 
order should not be prospectively modified. 
55-15e-8. Abstract of final order docketed in office of, 
circuit court clerk and In Judgment docket of district. 
court - Lien upon real property of obligor - Order ','',', 
having same effect as money judgment. 
55-15e-9. Property subject to execution or Hen -
Restriction on transfer or conveyance • Release of excess 
amount above liability to obligor. , ' : 
55-15e-10. Schedule of payments to be paid upon ' 
liability • Establishment - Cancellation. i 
55-15e-ll. Extension of time in proceedings. • 
55-15e-12. Statute of limitations.
 v j 
55-15e-13. Legal representation at hearings and 
proceedings. ' 
• • • : " "' ' " ' - i '>• 4 » • • : ' '•' ' ' . . ' ; : ' 
55-15e-l. Citation of chapter. 
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as 
the "Administrative Determination of Overpayments 
A c t / ' 1984 
55-15e-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: :•!'.'' 
. (1) "Court order" means a judgment or order of a 
small claims, circuit, or district court of the state, or 
of a court of comparable jurisdiction in another 
state, ordering repayment of an overpayment. 
(2) "Department" means the Department of Social 
Services. 
(3) "Obligor" means an individual who is liable to 
the State under Subsections 55-15a-24(l) and (2) 
and applicable federal statutes and regulations, or 
against whom an order determining overpayment 
has been issued by the department or an administr-
ative hearing examiner. 
(4) "Overpayment" means a state or federally 
funded entitlement benefit, or assistance, paid to or 
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in behalf of an individual who is either ineligible to 
receive the benefit or assistance or ineligible to 
receive it at the level paid to the individual, whether 
or not the individual fraudulently obtained the 
payment. . ... • l 9 M 
55-15e-3, Obligor presumed to have received 
notice of department's rights - Adoption of 
regulations by department - Powers of 
department to administer chapter - Recovery of 
attorney's fees, costs and interests. 
(1) An obligor is presumed to have received notice 
of the rights of the department under this chapter 
upon engaging, in the state of Utah, in any of the 
acts described in Subsections 55-15a-24(l) and 
(2). 
(2) The department may adopt, amend, and 
enforce such regulations as may be necessary to 
carry out this chapter including, without limiting the 
generality of the foregoing, regulations prescribing 
rules for narrowing issues and simplifying methods 
of proof at hearings. The regulations shall include 
procedures for serving the notices required under 
this chapter. 
(3) For the purposes of this chapter, the depart-
ment through its director or his authorized represe-
ntative may administer oaths, certify official acts, 
issue subpoenas, and compel witnesses and the 
production of business records, documents, and 
evidence. 
(4)(a) Except when an overpayment results from 
administrative error, the department may recover 
from the obligor reasonable attorney fees and costs 
incurred in pursuing administrative remedies under 
this chapter, and interest not to exceed 1% per 
month on an amount determined to be due by 
administrative default order or the order of an 
administrative hearing examiner. The interest shall 
begin to accrue from the date the order is issued. 
(b) A notice or statement of amount due under 
this chapter issued prior to entry of an administra-
tive default order or order of an administrative 
hearing examiner shall advise the obligor of the 
department's right to assess attorney fees, costs, 
and interest, and shall disclose the amount of inte-
rest to be assessed. 1984 
55-15e-4. Determination of overpayment and 
fraudulently obtained benefits - Notice of 
determination - Service of notice - Default 
order. 
(1) If the obligor is not subject to a current court 
order, the department may determine administrati-
vely whether an overpayment was made and whether 
benefits were fraudulently obtained. It may then 
issue a notice of determination of overpayment and 
demand payment in full. If the obligor fails to pay 
the overpayment or to deliver a written response to 
the department within 30 days of service of notice 
on the obligor, the department may enter default 
against the obligor by administrative order. 
(2) The notice of determination shall include the 
following: 
(a) the amount of the overpayment; 
(b) a demand for payment of the amount of the 
overpayment within 30 days or, in the alternative, 
for delivery to the department of a written response 
to the demand within 30 days of service of the 
notice, asserting claimed defenses to the liability; 
(c) the period during which the liability accrued; 
(d) the basis of the liability; 
(e) a statement that the obligor has a right to a 
hearing and that he may obtain the hearing by 
request in his written response; and 
(f) a statement that if full payment or a written 
response is not received by the department within 30 
days from the date of service of the notice on the 
obligor, the department will issue a default order 
fixing the amount of the liability as reflected by the 
records and other evidence in the possession of the 
department and that collection action may be taken 
against the obligor, including, but not limited to, 
attachment, garnishment, and wage assignment. 
(3) Service of the notice of determination shall be 
made under department regulations which meet the 
standards of due process or under Rule 4, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. . 1984 
55-15e-5. Hearing - Location and time * 
Continuances - Official record - Findings 
required - Default - Service of findings upon 
, parties. 
(l)(a) Any person adversely affected by an action 
of the department under this chapter is entitled to a 
hearing. To obtain a hearing the person must file a 
request in writing with the director within 30 days 
after the person receives notification of the adverse 
action. The hearing shall be held in the person's 
county of residence or other place convenient to the 
person and shall be conducted by an administrative 
hearing examiner. The hearing shall be held within 
30 days after the request is filed! 
(b) The department may promulgate regulations 
establishing criteria for the granting of continuances 
of hearing dates. 
(2) The department shall make and retain an 
official record of the hearing. 
(3) The administrative hearing examiner shall 
make specific findings of fact based on evidence and 
testimony presented at the hearing. The findings of 
fact shall include, but not be limited to, the follo-
wing: < 
(a) the actions in which the obligor engaged, 
resulting in the liability; 
(b) the amount of the liability; 
(c) the time period during which the liability 
accrued; 
(d) the facts upon which the liability is based; 
and i 
(e) the applicable state and federal statutes and 
regulations. , 
(4) If the obligor fails to appear at the time and 
place set for the hearing, upon proof of proper 
notice to the obligor, the administrative hearing 
examiner shall enter his findings of fact and order 
by default. 
(5) Within 30 days after the last day of the 
hearing or the entry of default, the administrative 
hearing examiner shall have a copy of the findings 
of fact and final order served upon the parties. 1984 
55-15e-6. Judicial review - Procedure. 
(1) When findings and an order have been entered 
by the administrative hearing examiner subsequent 
to a hearing, judicial review of those findings and 
order may be secured by any person adversely aff-
ected thereby by filing a petition in the district court 
of the county where the hearing was conducted 
within 30 days after receipt of notice of the order. 
(a) At the time of filing the petition, a copy shall 
be served upon all parties to the hearing, and shall 
state the grounds upon which review is sought. 
(b) Service may be made by mailing to the parties 
or to the legal counsel who represented the parties at 
the hearing. The petitioner and the department shall 
in all cases be considered the original parties to the 
judicial review. 
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(c) The department shall certify and file with the 
court all documents and papers relevant to the 
review, a transcript o f all testimony taken during the 
hearing, and the administrative hearing examiner's 
findings of fact and order. ,; ' 
(2) Within 30 days after the filing of the petition, 
the petitioner shall file and serve a memorandum of 
points and authorities, supporting in detail the 
grounds set forth in the petition for judicial review. 
If the petitioner relies upon the transcript, he shall 
cite in the memorandum the pages and the lines in 
the transcript upon which he relies. • 
(3) Within 30 days after the filing of the memor-
andum by the petitioner, the department shall file 
and serve a memorandum of answering points and 
authorities. If the department relies upon the tran-
script, the department shall cite in its memorandum 
the pages and the lines in the transcript upon which 
it relies. 
(4) Upon expiration of the time permitted for 
filing of the memorandum of answering points and 
authorities or upon the filing of the memorandum, 
either party may notify the clerk to submit the 
matter for decision, which shall be made without 
oral argument unless oral argument is requested by' 
either party or the court. 
(5) For good cause shown the district court may 
grant a trial de novo. 1984 
55-15e-7. Order to show cause why previously 
entered order should not be prospectively 
modified. 
In addition to , or in lieu of, any other action 
provided for under this chapter, and in the absence 
of an intervening court order, the department, upon 
petition by the obligor or on its own initiative, may, 
based on a material change in circumstances and 
good cause shown, issue an order requiring an 
obligor to show cause why the order previously 
entered should not be prospectively modified. The 
order to show cause and a copy of any affidavit 
upon which it is based shall be served on the obligor» 
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A hearing 
on the order to show cause shall be provided in the 
same manner, and determinations shall be based on 
the same considerations, as provided under Section 
55-15e-5. 19M 
55-15e-8. Abstract of final order docketed in 
' office of circuit court clerk and in judgment 
docket of district court - Lien upon real 
property of obligor • Order having same effect 
as money judgment. 
( l ) (a) A n abstract of a final order may be dock-
eted in the office of the clerk o f any circuit court 
and in the judgment docket of any district court of 
any county in the state. The time of the receipt of 
the abstract must be noted by the clerk on the abs-
tract and entered in the docket. 
(b) When the abstract is docketed in the district 
court, the award in the order shall, from the time.of 
docketing, constitute a lien upon the real property 
of the obligor situated in that county, for a period 
of eight years from the date of the order unless 
previously satisfied. 
(c) The final order fixing the liability of the 
obligor shall have the same effect as any other 
money judgment entered in a circuit court or a dis-
trict court. • ' 1984 
55*15e-9. Property subject to execution or lien -
Restriction on transfer or conveyance - Release 
of excess amount above liability to obligor. 
(1) After receiving notice of the docketing of an 
abstract under thi« chapter, a person in possession 
of any property which may be subject to execution 
or lien may not pay over, release, sell, transfer, 
encumber, or convey that property to any person 
other than the department, unless the person in 
possession first receives a release or waiver from the 
department, or a court order stating that the liability 
does not exist or has been satisfied. ; ; * 
(2) If a person has in his possession earnings, 
deposits, accounts, or balances owing to the obligor 
in excess of $100 over the amount of the liability 
claimed by the department, the person in possession 
may, without liability under this chapter, release the 
excess to the obligor. 1984 
55-15e-10. Schedule of payments to be paid upon 
liability - Establishment - Cancellation. 
The department may, consistent with the income, 
earning capacity, and resources of the obligor, set or 
reset at any time the level and schedule of payments 
to be paid upon the liability and may cancel the 
schedule of payments at any time and demand 
immediate payment in full. ; *: 1994 
55-15e- l l . Extension of time in proceedings. 
If the administrative hearing examiner determines 
that good cause exists for an extension of time in 
relation to any proceedings under this chapter, the 
examiner shall grant the extension.
 t
 !
 »
 19M 
55-15e-12. Statute of limitations. 
N o action for the enforcement of an order o f 
liability or lien issued under this chapter may be 
maintained unless it is commenced within eight years 
after the date of the order. 1984 
55-15e-13. Legal representation at hearings and 
proceedings. 
(1) A party may be represented by legal counsel at 
any hearing held under this chapter. 
(2) At the request of the department it is the duty 
of, the attorney general or the county attorney to 
represent the department in any proceeding comm-
enced under this chapter. " , 1984 
Chapter 16. Reporting Physical Abuse of 
Minors ^ t . 
55-16-1 through 55-16-7. Repealed. 1978 
Chapter 17. Job Training Coordination 
Act 
55-17-1 through 55-17-5. Repealed. 
55-17-6. Short title. 
55-17-7. Definitions. 
55-17-8. Creation of Job Training Coordinating Council. 
55-17-9. Membership of council. 
55-17-10. Creation of Office of Job Training for 
Economic Development. 
55-17-11. Duties of Job Training Coordinating Council 
55-17-12. Limitations on council.
 v 
55-17-13. Duties of private industry council. 
55-17-1 through 55-17-5. Repealed. j , 1985 
55-17-6. Short title. 
This act is known as the "Job Training Coordin-
ation Act." • • • • . . - « 1985 
55-17-7. Definitions. 
As used in Sections 55-17-6 through 55-17-
1 3 : '• •'• • . j 
(1) "Job Training Partnership Act": means the 
federal law enacted in 29 U.S .C . Section 1501, et 
seq. '• i ' '. !• 
(2) "Job Training Coordinating Council" or 
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till TY A WHl TAKER 1 1 ijj^ ; < ? • ' ' 
' "" " yt/^y< 2<tO N 1 0 0 W -K IGhAM 
uT 343C2 
EFFECTIVE NUVEfbEk 3 0 , 19 34 YOUR FINANCIAL AND-Ck K t U l C A L 
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P l t A S e CONTACT YuUR DISTRICT O F F I C E . THIS ACTION I S EASED ON IriE LATEST 
iNFORKATluN KL HAVE ABOUT YOUR CASE. 
Y J U ^ t CONTACT YOuk DISTRICT OFFICE FOR A CITATION OF THE 
K C & U L A T I L - N UPON R-hKH THIS ACTION IS EASED. THE DISTRICT OFFICE R I L L 
ALSu i * P O V YUO UF THE ELEMENTS USED If . ANY BUDGET COMPUTATION. ^ O ' N T A C T 
THE DISTRICT OFFICE AT I O ' J O SOUTH tOC REST LR1GHAM C I I Y , u l A r i 
t n 3 0 2 7 2 3 ~ r b S i . 
F A M L Y PLANNING SERVICES ARE AVAILABLE. IF YOU D E S I K E ThEr.. CONTACT 
YOCv J i S T r , l C T D I V I S I O N uF FAHlLY SERVICES. INFORMATION RtGA«.DING YUUR 
RlGriTb TO A FAIR HEARING IS AVAILABLE ON ThE BACK uF T h l S NOTICE. 
D I S T i 01 PI TEAH1 CNbC21 t7 t f c50 C A I G TOAFKS RUN 171 t -AUA F O R K I ^ C 
ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS A DM I N 1 S T K A T I ON 
APPendix "H» p age 1 of i 
Social Services 
November 19, 1984 
Betty Ann Vhitaker 
240 N. 1st W. 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
RE: Overpayment 
(acct #): 60180482R-1 
Dear Ms. Whitaker: 
The Coramunity Operations District Office has reported to this office 
that while on public assistance you incurred the following 
overpayment(s): 
Financial $ 
Medical $ 
Food Stamp $1,116.00 
during June 1983 through July 1984 due to an intentional program 
violation. 
Please pay this amount to the Office of Recovery Services or contact 
me within ten (10) days from the date of this letter to discuss this 
matter. 
If you fail to contact me within the requested period of time, policy 
requires this agency to take a different and stronger legal course of 
action. Our office, however, wants to avoid such activity and 
appreciates your cooperation. 
Thank you in advance for your prompt attention to this matter. 
Sincerely, 
Terry SCTIOW 
I n v e s t i g a t o r 
Telephone 627-0545 
TS/pr 
T 60 
Office of Recovery Services Appendix " 1 - 1 " Ogcenotf.ce 553 26 
JDhr= AtDSt: D.ecto- p a g e ]_ Q f ]_ Cgaen 
Scott W Matr.eson, Governor Stale of Utah 
Norman G Angus Executive Director 
Social Services 
December 6, 1984 
Betty Ann Whitaker 
240 North 1st West 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
RE: Overpayment 
Account Number: 60180482R-2 
Dear Ms. Whitaker: 
The Community Operations District Office has reported to this office 
that while on public assistance you incurred the following 
overpayment(s): 
Financial: $80.00 
Medical: $ 0.00 
Food Stamp: $0.00 
during May through October 1984 due to an intentional program 
violation. 
Please pay this amount to the Office of Recovery Services or contact 
me within ten (10) days from the date of this letter to discuss this 
matter. 
If you fail to contact roe within the requested period of time, policy 
requires this agency to take a different and stronger legal course of 
action. Our office, however, wants to avoid such activity and 
appreciates your cooperation. 
Thank you in advance for your prompt attention to this matter. 
Sincerely, 
T. Schow 
Investigator 
Telephone: 627-0545 
T60 
OgoenOM.ce 533 26?n S f e e t Suae 201 
Gsaen u ' a * 64401 -2416 
3 0 ^ - 6 2 7 - 0 5 4 0 
Scot t M Matheson. Governor State o? Utah 
Norman G Angus. Execut ive Director 
Office of Recovery Services 
John P A t o o t ! .D.rector 
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18 9 * .# ' ' Scoll M Matheson Governor State of Utah 
Norman G Angus. Executive Director 
December 12, 1984 
Betty Ann Whitalcer 
240 N. 1st West * 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
RE: Acct. #60180482R-1 - Balance $1,196.00 
Dear Ms. Whitaker: 
You have failed to respond to our letter sent to you ten days ago. 
Payment or arrangements must be made within ten (10) days to: STATE OF 
UTAH, OFFICE OF RECOVERY SERVICES, or legal action may follow without 
further notice to you. 
STATE OF UTAH vs. Betty Ann Whi taker may add court costs, interest, wage 
garnishments, State income Tax refund attachments, plus vehicles, 
properties, etc. 
Please respond promptly. 
Sincerely, 
Terry Schow 
Investigator 
Telephone: 627-0545 
T60 
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Office of Recovery Services 
JohnP Abbott. Director 
Ogden Office. 533 26tn Street. Suite 201 
OQden Utan 84401 -2416 
801-627-0540 
An Equal Opportunity Employer 
Utah-DSS-APA 
Form, 490 6/83 
24 30 34 
HEARING RIGHTS 
U N D E R W H A T C I R C U M S T A N C E S : You have the right to an agency c o n f e r e n c e - a meeting with your local off ice 
worker and his supervisor—to d iscuss any disagreements you have. 
You also have the right to a hearing before an impartial Hearing Examiner if the Distr ict Off ice has taken any of the 
fol lowing act ions: 
1 . Failed to act upon your appl icat ion wi th in 30 days, or denied your appl icat ion, OR 
2. Reduced, held, d iscont inued, or changed the form of your assistance, OR 
3. Required you to part icipate in a Work Experience and Training program, OR 
4. In any other way acted against your interests, in violation of the law. 
W H E N TO R E Q U E S T A H E A R I N G : If you are receiving assistance, and you mail or personally deliver a wri t ten hearing 
request wi th in 15 days of the mailing of the No t ice of Decis ion with which you disagree, usually your assistance wil l be 
cont inued or reinstated as before, unti l there is a decision as a result of the hearing. 
There are some except ions to the cont inuance of benefits and the 15 day time limit for hearing requests. Contact the 
Distr ict Off ice for policy concerning your specif ic case. 
If you request a hearing because you were notif ied that your assistance would be reduced or terminated, and your 
assistance was cont inued or reinstated pending a hearing decis ion, aii or part of the assistance issued due to your request 
may be an overpayment and may be recovered if the hearing decision upholds the agency act ion, and you are 
unsuccessfu l in your further appeal of that decis ion. 
D E A D L I N E : A hearing wi l l not be granted unless you request it wi th in 90 days of the action with which you disagree. In 
addit ion, if you receive food stamps, you may request a fair hearing wi th in your cert i f icat ion period on your current level of 
benefits. 
LEGAL A S S I S T A N C E A N D O T H E R H E L P : In deciding whether to file a request for an agency conference or a hearing, 
you may contact a local legal services office or other community agency. You may be entit led to free legal assistance. 
Your worker at your local Distr ict Community Operat ions Off ice can tell you where to obtain free legal assistance. You 
have the right to bring your attorney and any other person to the agency conference or hearing. You may bring a statement 
from a doctor of your choice if your problem is about medical assistance. You or your representative may review all 
materials in your case fi le. The only exception is for conf ident ial information. 
H O W TO R E Q U E S T A H E A R I N G A N D / O R A C O N F E R E N C E : 
may complete the bottom half of this form and mail it to: 
If you want a hearing and/or an agency conference, you 
Department of Social Services 
Hearing Examiner 
P.O. Box 2500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2500 
OR Personally deliver the form to your 
local District Office 
REQUEST FOR AGENCY CONFERENCE OR A HEARING 
• I want an agency conference. 
EB I want a hearing. 
• I want my benefits continued. 
• I do NOT want my benefits continued. 
I am making this request because . 
^ i H ^ L j t L j > ^J-rr>K_J , /f ^ jt-Aj J jCLAU ^LJL^^L £} ^ j^£ J , 
txm\iV5i\ - t o 
UtC-26 1354 
Name : dtJXci &* „Q -LQhA&JUA ) 
Address: J v / /} • / € > <j) • 
U*J~jj/^U*Q UJn YjS.?93tJL 
Attorney or representative: 
Name: L 
Phone: ? 3 9 / - f V 3 / 
H i . h n i j ^ u 
Soc. Sec. No.: 
Phone: 
Date: 
L*-JUAJ ft- ~&<f-Cl* 
Address: 4 * 3 - J *f & M~ > 
$*M,), *&-* fVYO/ 
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UTAH-DSS-ORS-BCS 
FORM 743,2 - 1/85 
..  % 
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICES, 
Plaintiff \ 
vs. 
Betty Ann Whitaker 
Defendant 
SSN: 502-16-7665 
To: Betty Ann Whitaker 
2A0 North 100 West 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: 
You have been scheduled to attend an informal conference on August 27, 
1985, at the hour of 11:00 a.m. at 533 - 26th Street, Suite 201, Ogden,, Utah 
84401 before an Investigator of the Office of Recovery Services. 
The purpose of this conference, in lieu of a formal hearing, is to give 
you an opportunity to examine the State*s evidence regarding your overpayment 
obligation and an opportunity to provide your own evidence relating to this 
matter. 
Please fill out the enclosed Income/Asset Affidavit, and bring this and 
any supporting information to the conference. If you cannot make this 
appointment, please telephone to make arrangements for another time or return 
this form with the rescheduling information below completed, to the Office of 
Recovery Services, 533 - 26th Street, Suite 201, Ogden, Utah 84401. 
I would prefer to reschedule 
my informal conference on 
f 198 
at AM/PM 
I can be reached at , telephone: 
T60/TS 
0212C 
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STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
NOTICE OF INFORMAL 
CONFERENCE 
CASE NO. 60180482R-1,2,3 
T.A Sctiow, Investigator 
533 26tti Street, Suite 201 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
627-0540 
UTAH-DSS-ORS-BCS 
FORM 743.1 - 3/85 
24 3Z JZ 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
r 
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICES, 
Plaintiff 
v s . • ) 
Betty Ann Uhitaker ) 
Defendant ) 
SSN: 502-16-7665 ) 
) NOTICE OF OVERPAYMENT 
1 DETERMINATION 
1 CASE NO. 60180482R-1,2,3 
To: Betty Ann Whitaker 
240 North 100 West 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: 
1, During the time period(s) of June 1, 1983 through October 31, 1984 
you received $1377,88 in public assistance to which you were not entitled as 
follows: 
Program 
Financial 
Food Stamps 
Medical 
Time Period 
05-01-84 to 10-31-84 
06-01-83 to 07-31-84 
05-01-84 to 10-31-84 
Total Obligation 
Less Total Payments 
Total Debt 
Amount 
80.00 
1166.00 
131.88 
1377.88 
0.00 
1377.88 
2. You were not entitled to the above because excess resources. 
3. The State of Utah, pursuant to UCA 55-15a-24, is entitled to recover all 
overpayments of public assistance. 
4. Within 30 days of this notice you are required to do one of the 
following: 
a. Pay the entire amount of the overpayment in full to the Office of 
Recovery Services, P. 0. Box 15400, SLC, Utah 84115 Attn: Team #60/TS. 
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FORM 743,1 - Page 2 of 2 
, b. Attend an informal conference with a representative of the Office 
of Recpvery^ Services , at which you may reach an agreement as to the cause and 
the amount of the overpayment, agree to a monthly repayment amount and 
stipulate to an order and judgment to repay that amount to the Office of 
Recovery Services* 
c. Request a formal hearing on the enclosed Legal Rights/Written 
Answer form, if you cannot reach an agreement with this office on the amount 
of your obligation and/or a repayment amount and/or stipulate to an order and 
judgment for the same* 
5. If you fail to do one of the above, a default judgment, for the 
entire amount (as listed in #1 above) will be entered against you and docketed 
with the appropriate court. The State of Utah will then proceed to collect 
the judgment and 12 percent per annum interest thereon by any legal means 
available including but not limited to, attachment, garnishment and wage 
assignment. In addition, an Administrative Disqualification Hearing will be 
held regarding the Food Stamp portion of your overpayment obligation, if one 
exists* 
6. This action is being brought pursuant to the provisions of Section 
55-15e-l et. seq., as amended, 1953* 
7. HAVING RECEIVED THIS NOTICE, YOU NOW HAVE THE LEGAL OBLIGATION TO 
NOTIFY THE OFFICE OF RECOVERY SERVICES OF ANY CHANGE IN YOUR ADDRESS OR 
EMPLOYMENT* 
Dated July 2, 1985. 
T60/TS. 
0212C 
T. SchdW, Investigator 
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I p f i i i N(> 
WRITT1N ANtWEft 
• * 
Name: _ . Phone: 
(Please print full name as It appears of the enclosed Notice) 
Address 
Social Security No.: _ Date of Birth: 
Chlld(ren)'e Names: _ 
I do not want an Informal conference. I request a hearing before the Administra-
tive Law Judge. I will be represented/accompanied by: 
Name:._ Phone: 
Address: 
This person: D is an attorney D is not an attorney. 
I am making this request because: (check) 
D I do not agree with the amount of the total debt claimed by the Office of 
Recovery Services. 
D I do not agree with the amount of the monthly ongoing obligation, and no 
court order is in effect covering the same. 
EXPLANATION: 
Signature: Date: 
* * * CONFIDENTIAL * * * 
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•TATI OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
LEGAL RIGHTS/WRITTEN ANSWER 
CONFERENCE 
You have the option to attend an Informal conference with a representative of the Office of 
Recovery Services, the purpose of such a conference is to afford you an opportunity to exam-
ine the State's evidence of your debt, and an opportunity to provide your own evidence relating 
to the same An informal conference will also provide an opportunity to discuss a fair monthly 
ongoing obligation, if such has not already been established by a court. 
HEARING 
If you cannot reach an agreement in an informal conference, or do not desire an informal con-
ference with an agency representative, under the U.S. Constitution and Utah law (Utah Code 
Annotated Section 78-45P-6), you have the right to a formal hearing before an independent Ad-
ministrative Law Judge. 
Focus of Inquiry at the Hearing 
The Administrative Law Judge may determine the total amount of your debt and ongoing 
obligation, if such has not already been established by a court. He may also determine whether 
you have failed to make payments past due in the amount the Office of Recovery Services 
claims. However, the Administrative Law Judge cannot modify the amount of support due and 
owing under a valid Court Order of this or any other State, and cannot determine issues of 
paternity. 
The hearing will be held in the county of your residence or other place of convenience to you 
within thirty (30) days after the request has been filed. Written findings will be made within 
twenty (20) days of the date of the hearing which determines your liability and responsibility. 
Your Right to Answer and Question 
You are entitled to remain completely silent so that nothing you say can be used against you 
(i.e.. you can force the Office of Recovery Services to make out its case against you). You can 
rebut any unfavorable evidence they present against you and can present any written or oral 
evidence of your own. 
If you desire a heading complete and sign the WRITTEN ANSWER or. the reverse side of this 
form and mail it to Office of Recovery Services, P.O Box 15400, Salt Lake City Utah 
64115-0400 You will be sent notice of the time and place of the hearing. 
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INCOME/ASSET AFFIDAVIT 
Complete this form except for the signature by filling in every item. For each item that does not apply wirte the 
letters "NA". Bring this form to the scheduled appointment at the local office address where it may be signed in the 
presence of a Notary Public. Those items marked with a asterisk (•) must be verified by bringing in copies of bills, 
receipts, check stubs, etc. 
Your Name . 
Date of Birth . 
Social Security Number. 
Phone Number 
Street. 
City . State . Zip. 
Length of Time at Address . 
Closest Relative's Name . 
Previous Employer 
Present Employer 
Addi ess 
Buying . Renting From . 
Address . Ph. No. 
Previous Gross Income-Hourly . 
Dates Emp. 
. Monthly . 
'Gross Income-Hourly . 
Wile's Employer 
Address 
•Other Income 
Bank 
Monthly 
Phone Number. 
Present Wife's Name _ 
Dates Emp. _ 
'Gross Income-Hourly Monthly . 
Credit Union . 
Checking 
Savings 
Length of Time at Bank . 
Branch 
Account No. . 
Account No. . 
Balance . 
Balance . 
Stocks/Bonds . 
Present Wife (Yes or No) If yes, number of stepchildren in your household: 
Number ol your children living in your household 
Dale 
Dobl 
Inclined 
Mo 
Pyml. 
Amount 
Balance 
Owed 
Estimated 
Current 
Value 
* Real Estate 
(House, Rental 
Property, etc.) 
* Vehicles/Cars, 
Trucks, Boats, 
Motorcycles, 
Snowmobiles, etc. 
* Other Debts 
Paid To: 
'Rental $ 
General Comments: 
/Mo. Utilities $ . . /Mo. Telephone $_ ./Mo. 
I corlily tluit Ihu above is liuo to the bust ol my knowledge and bo lie I 
DEFANDANT 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
My Commission Expires: 
DATE 
day ol , 19_ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
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Robert D. Barclay 
Deputy Weber County Attorney 
533 - 26th Street, Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-2354 
UajflJflM 5 bun 
Not served with a Summons -
served for the purpose of 
advising the defendant of 
the information upon which 
attachment/garnishment is 
issued 
IN THE SEO0ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT (XXJRT OF WBBER OODOTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, Department of 
Social Services, Office of 
Recovery Services, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BETTY A. WHITAKER, 
Defendant. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
Civil NO. 9311? 
-—\
 x Plaintiff complains and alleges for cause of action against the 
^ } 
v /defendant as follows: 
\V M\ ;€ / CLAIM AGAINST DEFENEftNT 
W Mr J 
The defendant is a resident of Weber County, Utah, presently 
v^p \^living at^04 - 22nd Street, Ogden, Utah. 
2. During the period June, 1983, through October, 1984, the 
defendant received public assistance benefits from the plaintiff, but was not 
entitled to receive a portion thereof and was accordingly overpaid, to wit: 
Assistance Amt Received Amt Eligible to Receive Overpayment 
A. Financial $ 80.00 $ .00 $ 80.00 
B. Food Stamps 1,166.00 .00 1,166.00 
C. Medical 131.88 .00 131.88 
TOTALS $1,407.88 $ .00 $1,407.88 
3. Said overpayment occurred because the defendant failed to report 
correct and complete information to the plaintiff, which information would 
have directly affected the defendant's eligibility for the benefits, namely: 
Appendix " L " 
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Verified Complaint 
Betty A. Whitaker, Civil No. 
the defendant had an approximate $20f000.00 equity in a hone which should have 
been reported and counted as a financial resource in determining her 
eligibility. Defendants actions constituted fraudulent misrepresentation 
upon which the plaintiff relied in issuing the said benefits to the defendant. 
4. The defendant has a duty to repay the overpayment
 f but has 
refused to do so. Defendant has requested a fair hearing before the District 
II (A) OCO-APA Office and the hearing officer has taken the matter under 
advisement. If the hearing officer rules against the dfifgnrknt, i't 1jg 
doubtful that she will pay the debt and direct action against her would be 
required. If the hearing officer rules against the State, the State has a 
right to obtain a trial de novo before the District Courtjgurgua.nt **> nt-^ h " 
Code Annotated 55-15a-25, which would require direct action against the 
defendant. This complaint is filed for either purpose. 
5. The costs, interest and attorney1 s fees presently approximate 
$1,092.12. 
REQUEST FOR PROVISIONAL REMEDY 
6. Pursuant to Rule 64C(o), and as referenced thereto in Rule 
64D(a) (i), Dtah Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may conroence action upon an 
obligation before it is due and have an attachment or garnishment issued 
against the property of the debtor. 
7. In Civil Case No. 16570, in the First District Court, Box Elder 
Appendix "L" 
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Betty Whitaker 
Verified Complaint 
County, the court has recently ordered that the defendant's equity in the home 
be paid to her. The plaintiff learned on October 15, 198^ that the 
defendant's former husband will accordingly pay to the First District Court 
Qerk the approximate sun of $17,574.39 on October 16, 1985. 
8. The defendant's former attorney, Pandine Salerno, has an 
atttorney's lien filed against said proceeds in the approximate amount of 
$ 618.00. After paying the attorney's lien, there are sufficient funds 
available to pay the $ 1,407.88 which is due to the plaintiff, plus costs, 
interest and a reasonable attorney's fee. 
9. To the knowledge of the plaintiff, the defendant has no legal 
set-offs; attachment or garnishment is not sought to hinder, delay or defraud 
any creditor of the defendant; the payment of the plaintiff's claim has not 
been secured by any mortgage or lien upon real or personal property in this 
state; the defendant is about to dispose of said proceeds with the intent to 
defraud the plaintiff; and as stated in paragraph 3 above, the defendant 
fraudulently incurred the obligation respecting which this action is brought. 
10. The First District Court Qerk will forward said proceeds to the 
defendant and/or the former attorney immediately upon receipt* 
11. TO the plaintiff's knowledge the defendant has not filed a 
declaration of homestead with respect to the real property or said proceeds. 
Further, said proceeds are not earnings for personal services of the defendant 
and are not otherwise exempt from attachment or garnishment under Title 78, 
Chapter 23 of Utah Code Annotated. 
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Betty Whitaker 
Verified Complaint 
12. The plaintiff is not required to file a bond or undertaking. 
13. Unless a prejudgment order of attachment or garnishment is 
issued without notice the defendant will receive the proceeds and dispose of 
them. Ihe plaintiff knows of no other assets from which the claim can be 
satisfied. Accordingly, the plaintifff will suffer irreparable injuryf loss 
and damage in that the defendant will not again have a fund from which the 
entire debt due to the plaintiff can be paid. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays and moves for judgment and order of the 
court as follows: 
1. Judgment against the defendant in the amount of $1,407.88, plus 
costs and interest, as may be appropriate pending the decision of the fair 
hearing officer. 
2. Attorney's fees pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 15-15a-24(7). 
3. An order of pre-judgment attachment or garnishment directing the 
First District Court Clerk to retain $2,500.00 from any and all funds received 
on behalf of the defendant (but to pay the balance thereof to the defendant's 
attorney pursuant to the attorney's lien and to the defendant). 
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Betty Whitaker 
Verified Complaint 
4. For the court to set a date and time certain for hearing on the 
order of pre-judgment attachment or garnishment at the earliest reasonable 
time* 
DATED this /£ day of October, 1985. 
ELAINE GUNNERSCN 
Supervisor, r-60 
Office of Recovery Services 
/ / / r ) / 
Jju^f% ^IUAJL^ 
ROBERT D. BARCLAY / ) 
Deputy Weber County Attorney 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF OTAH ) 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) SS. 
Elaine Gunnerson, being f i r s t duly sworn, states on oath that she has 
read the foregoing Canplaint and to the best of her knowledge and belief the 
allegations and facts stated therein are true and correct. 
DATED t h i s /£ day of October, 1985. 
iLAINE GUNNERSCtf 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this A 'day of October, 1985. 
^ V T ^ n y $t^*dL—-
NOTARY PUBLtC£/tX3DEN, UTAH 
:
 C\)l My Conmission Expires: , , / „ M l\)ilM tf^j^L 
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STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
STATE OF UTAH, Department of 
Social Services 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BETTY ANN WHITAKER, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF DISMISSAL OF 
NOTICE OF OVERPAYMENT 
DETERMINATION 
Case No: 60180482R-1,2,3 
TO: Betty A. Whitaker 
504 22nd Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: 
That the above-named plaintiff hereby dismisses the Notice of 
Overpayment Determination, dated July 2, 1985. 
The claim raised in said Notice shall be adjudicated in the judicial 
action, State of Utah v. Betty A. Whitaker, Weber County Case Niimber 93725. 
Additionally, proceedings are pending regarding said claim pursuant to your 
request for a hearing on December 26, 1984 (elected under section ^ 5-15a-25, 
U.C.A.). 
Dated: November 5, 1985 
T*. Sohow, Investigator 
V 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Notice of Dismissal of Notice of Overpayment Determination to the 
defendant, Betty Ann Whitaker at 504 22nd Street, Ogden, UT 84401 this 
T ^ ^ day of November, 1985. 
^lljO^U i , >/ IAJA. xhi/aK 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, Department of 
Social Services, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
BETTY A. WHITAKER, ' 
Defendant. 1 
i RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS 
1 Case No. 93725 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is in essence based upon 
whether or not the plaintiff can maintain a judicial action while 
there is a pending administrative action. The plaintiff claims 
the two actions will adjudicate similar issues. The adminis-
trative action will not result in a money judgment. The 
administrative action was a hearing requested by defendant to 
establish eligibility and is not related to a collection action. 
I can determine no statutory prohibition against the 
State commencing this action, and the doctrine of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies does not appear to be applicable. 
Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied. 
DATED this ol frdav of Decemberf 1985. 
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Ruling on Motion to Dismiss 
Case No. 93725 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of Decemberf 
1985f a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on Motion 
to Dismiss was served upon the following: 
Robert D. Barclay 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
533 26th Street/ Suite 200 
Ogdenf Utah 84401 
Curtis L, Child 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES/ INC. 
Attorney for Defendant 
385 24th Street/ Suite 522 
Ogdenf Utah 84401 
CARR/ Secretary 
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Utah-DSS-APA 
Volume II 
400 - 404 
2-86 
400 Asset Standards 
Only assets acutally available to an individual shall be considered 
in establishing eligiblity. All possible assets must be explored. 
1. When an applicant or recipient owns property and has the legal 
right to sell it without interference, the property is available 
and we will count it in determining eligibility. 
2. Any assets controlled by a legal guardian are available for the 
support of the ward and should be considered available to the 
ward in determining eligibility. 
3. Life estates are not considered available assets. 
402 Asset Limits 
The equity value of all non-exempt real and personal property cannot 
exceed $1,000, regardless of the size of the household. ! 
402.1 Determining the Value of Assets 
Assets shall be reasonably evaluated according to their 
equity value. 
1. Equity value means fair market value less any 
obligations or debts still owing an the asset. 
2. Fair Market value means the price a particular item 
will sell for on the open market in the geographic 
area involved. 
404 Personal Property 
Personal property includes liquid assets and items other than real 
property, such as, but not limited to the following examples. 
1. Liquid assets: Those properties in the form of cash or 
convertible to cash, including savings accounts, checking 
accounts, stocks (including water stock),, bonds, mutual fund 
shares, promissary notes, mortages, loan or cash value of 
insurance policies, trust funds, agreements in escrow, income 
tax refunds and similar properties. 
2. All motor vehicles, including automobiles, trucks, motorbikes, 
motorcycles, snowmobiles, etc. 
3. Boats, campers, trailers. 
df Life Estate: There is no legal ownership of the property but the 
person retains the right to use the property until the time of death. 
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Office of Family Assistance, HHS 
(C) If agency policies provide for al-
location of the individual's income as 
necessary for the support of his de-
pendents, such allocation shall not 
exceed the total amount of their need 
as determined by the State's need 
standard; 
(D) Income after application of dis-
regards, except as provided in para-
graph (a)(3)(xiii) of this section, and 
resources available for current use 
shall be considered. To the extent not 
inconsistent with any other provision 
of this chapter, income and resources 
are considered available both when ac-
tually available and when the appli-
cant or recipient has a legal interest in 
a liquidated sum and has the legal 
ability to make such sum available for 
support and maintenance. 
(E) Income and resources will be rea-
sonably evaluated. Resources will be 
evaluated according to their equity 
value. 
(P) When the AFDC assistance 
unit's income, after applying applica-
ble disregards, exceeds the State need 
standard for the family because of re-
ceipt of nonrecurring earned or un-
earned lump sum income, the family 
will be ineligible for aid for the full 
number of months derived by dividing 
the sum of the lump sum income and 
other income by the monthly need 
standard for a family of that size. Any 
income remaining from this calcula-
tion is income in the first month fol-
lowing the period of ineligibility. The 
period of ineligibility shall begin with 
the month of receipt of the nonrecur-
ring income or, at State option, as late 
as the corresponding payment month. 
For purposes of applying the lump 
sum provision, family includes all per-
sons whose needs are taken into ac-
count in determining eligibility and 
the amount of the assistance payment. 
A State may shorten the remaining 
period of ineligibility when: the stand-
ard of need increases and the amount 
the family would have received also 
changes; the lump sum income or a 
portion thereof becomes unavailable 
to the family for a reason beyond the 
control of the family; or the family 
incurs and pays for medical expenses. 
If the State chooses to shorten the 
period of ineligibility, the State plan 
shall: 
§ 233.20 
(J) Identify which of the above situ-
ations are included; 
(2) In the case of situations involv-
ing the increase in the need standard 
and changes in the amount that have 
been paid to the family, specify the 
types of circumstances which will be 
included; 
(3) In the case of situations involv-
ing the unavailability of the lump sum 
income, include a definition of un-
availability, and specify what reasons 
will be considered beyond the control 
of the family; 
(4) In the case of situations involv-
ing the payment of medical expenses, 
specify the types of medical expenses 
the State will allow to be offset 
against the lump sum income. 
For purposes of this paragraph (a)(3): 
Automobile means a passenger car or 
other motor vehicle used to provide 
transportation of persons or goods. (In 
AFDC, in appropriate geographic 
areas, one alternate primary mode of 
transportation may be substituted for 
the automobile); Equity value means 
fair market value minus encumbrances 
(legal debts); Fair market value means 
the price an item of a particular make, 
model, size, material or condition will 
sell for on the open market in the geo-
graphic area involved (If a motor vehi-
cle is especially equipped with appara-
tus for the handicapped, the appara-
tus shall not increase the value of the 
vehicle); liquid assets are those prop-
erties in the form of cash or other fi-
nancial instruments which are con-
vertible to cash and include savings ac-
counts, checking accounts, stocks, 
bonds, mutual fund shares, promissory 
notes, mortgages, cash value of insur-
ance policies, and similar properties; 
Need standard means the money value 
assigned by the State to the basic and 
special needs it recognizes as essential 
for applicants and recipients; Payment 
standard means the amount from 
which non-exempt income is subtract-
ed; 
(iii) States may prorate income re-
ceived by individuals employed on a 
contractual basis over the period of 
the contract or may prorate intermit-
tent income received quarterly, semi-
annually, or yearly over the period 
covered by the income. In OAA, AB, 
99 
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400 Resource Standards 
Use the available resources of a household when i t is interviewed, 
or as reported during the c e r t i f i c a t i o n per iod, to determine the 
household's e l i g i b i l i t y . 
These standards apply to a l l households, regardless of e l i g i b i l i t y 
for other types of assistance. However, a household in which a l l 
members receive AFDC benef i ts and whose income is not more than the 
gross income l im i t l i s ted on Table V has automatically sa t i s f i ed the 
resource c r i t e r i a . No fur ther examination of resources is necessar/. 
402 Maximum Allowable Resources 
1 . The maximum allowable resources of a l l household members sha l l 
not exceed 32,000 for the household except: 
A. Households with one or more members age 60 or older may 
have up to 33,000 in resources. 
2. To qual i fy for expedited service, a household may not have over 
$100 i n l i qu id resources described i n Section 404, item 1. 
404 Def in i t ion of Resources 
Include the fol lowing items as a household's resources: 
1 . A l l l i qu id resources, such as cash on hand, checking or saving 
accounts, saving ce r t i f i ca tes , stocks or bonds, and money 
received as a nonrecurring lump sum payment; funds held i n 
ind iv idual retirement accounts, ( IRA's) ; and funds held in KEOGH 
plans for only household members. 
The funds held in KEOGH plans must not involve the household 
member i n a contractural re lat ionship with non-household 
members. (For example, a husband and wife l i v ing together could 
not exclude the i r KEOGH plan unless a non-household member also 
par t ic ipates in the i r KEOGH plan). The value of the IRA or 
KEOGH plan i s the t o t a l cash value of the account or plan minus 
the amount of the penalty ( i f any) that would be lost as penalty 
for early withdrawal of the ent i re account. 
2. A l l nonliquid resources, personal property, licensed and 
unlicensed vehicles, bui ld ings, land, recreational properties 
and other property, provided these resources are not 
spec i f ica l ly excluded. 
3. The value of nonexempt resources, except for licensed vehicles, 
shal l be i t s equity value. The equity value i s the! f a i r market 
value less claims against the property. 
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4. The entire resource owned jointly by separate households counts for 
each.household. However, if the household can show it has access to 
only a part of the resource, count the lesser value. A resource does 
not count if it cannot practically be divided, and the other owner 
refuses to allow it to be sold, etc. 
5. Resources do not count for battered women and children living in 
shelters when both conditions are met: 
a. The resources are jointly owned with members of their former 
household, and 
b. They cannot have access to the resources without the agreement 
of a joint owner living in the former household. 
405 Resources of Nonhousehold and Ineligible Household Members 
1. The resources of nonhousehold members do not count. Nonhousehold 
members are defined in Section 206.5. They include roomers, live-in 
attendants, ineligible students and non-family members who do not buy 
or prepare food with the household. 
2. The resources of ineligible household members count for the rest of^ 
the household. Ineligible persons are defined in Section 206.3. 
They include ineligible aliens and disqualified persons. Do not 
count the ineligible person when comparing the household's resources 
to the resource eligibility limit. 
For example, the household has an elderly person who has been 
disqualified. Count the resources of all members, including the 
disqualified person, and use the normal resource limit of $1,500. 
Because the elderly person is disqualified, the resource limit of 
$3,000 cannot be used. 
3. Apply the same rules to exempt a resource used by or for ineligible 
members as for the eligible members. For example: Do not count 
work-related equipment essential to the employment of an ineligible 
member, nor one burial plot for such person. Do not count a vehicle 
necessary to transport an ineligible member who is physically 
disabled. 
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406 Exempt Resources 
Do not count the following items as resources: 
1. The home and surrounding property which is not separated from the 
home by intervening property owned by others. Public rights of way 
do not count as property owned by others. Property surrounding a 
home is exempt even though a road runs between it and the home. 
a. The home and property can be exempt when the home is temporarily 
not occupied, as long as the household intends to return to it. 
The household could be out of the home to work or receive 
training, for illness or because of a natural disaster or 
casualty. 
b. Do not count a lot on which household intends to build its 
home. Also exempt a home being built which is not yet finished. 
2. Household goods; personal effects; one burial plot per household 
member; the cash value of life insurance policies; caskets, urns, 
vaults or headstones; and the cash value of pension plans or funds, 
including KEOGH plans which involve the household member in a 
contract with a non-household member. 
a. IRA's must be counted as a liquid resource. 
3. Property which produces a reasonable return for its fair market 
value, even if only used on a seasonal basis, such as a farm tractor, 
rental home or vacation home. If such property does not produce a 
reasonable return on its fair market value, count it as a resource. 
4. Farm land, work related equipment, such as the tools of tradesman or 
the machinery of a farmer, and other property essential to the 
employment or self-employment or a household member. 
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6. Installment contracts for the sale of land or buildings if the 
contract or agreement is producing income consistent with its 
fair market value• The exclusion shall also apply to the value 
of the property sold under the installment contract, or held 
as security in exchange for a purchase price consistent with 
the fair market value of that property. 
When excess property is transferred on a sales contract basis after 
the date of application, the following criteria must be met: 
a. Monthly contractual payments must produce income at a 
reasonable return of at least one percent of the purchase 
price, AND 
B. The interest rate of the contractual agreement must include 
a rate representative of a reasonable return of no less that 6%. 
7. Any governmental payments which are designated for the restoration 
of a home damaged in a disaster, if the household is subject to a 
legal sanction, if the funds are not used as intended; for example, 
payments made by the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
through the individual and Family Grant Program or disaster loans 
or grants made by the Small Business Administration* 
8. Resources whose cash value is not accessible to the household, such 
as but not limited to, irrevocable trust funds, security deposits 
on rental property or utilities, property in probate, and real 
property which the household is making a good faith effort to sell 
at a reasonable price and which has not been sold. 
Any funds in a trust or transferred to a trust, and the income 
produced by that trust, shall be considered inaccessible to the 
household if: 
a. The trust is under the control and management of an institution, 
corporation or organization (the trustee) which is not under 
the direction or ownership of any household member; 
b. That trustee uses the funds solely to make investments on 
behalf of the trust or to pay the educational expenses of any 
person named by the household creating the trust; 
c. The trust investments do not directly involve or assist any 
business or corporation under the control, direction or influence 
of a household member; 
d. The trust arrangement will not likely cease during the certifi-
cation period; and 
e. No household member has the power to revoke the trust arrangement 
or change the name of the student beneficiary during the certi-
fication period. 
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specified in § 273.7(0 after the accept-
ance of such employment; 
(vii) Acceptance of a bona fide offer 
of employment ot more than 20 hours 
a week or in which the weekly earn-
ings are equivalent to the Federal min-
imum wage multiplied by 20 hours 
which, because of circumstances 
beyond the control of the primary 
wage earner, subsequently either does 
not materialize or results in employ-
ment of less than 20 hours a week or 
weekly earnings of less than the Fed-
eral minimum wage multiplied by 20 
hours; and 
(viii) Leaving a job in connection 
with patterns of employment in which 
workers frequently move from one em-
ployer to another such as migrant 
farm labor or construction work. 
There may be some circumstances 
where households will apply for food 
stamp benefits between jobs particu-
larly in cases where work may not yet 
be available at the new job site. Even 
though employment at the new site 
has not actually begun, the quitting of 
the previous employment shall be con-
sidered as with good cause if part of 
the pattern of that type of employ-
ment. 
(4) Verification, (i) To the extent 
that the information given by the 
household is questionable, as defined 
in § 273.2(f)(2), State agencies shall re-
quest verification of the household's 
statements. The primary responsibil-
ity for providing verification as provid-
ed in § 273.2(f)(5) rests with the house-
hold. If it is difficult or impossible for 
the household to obtain documentary 
evidence in a timely manner the State 
agency shall offer assistance to the 
household to obtain the needed verifi-
cation. Acceptable sources of verifica-
tion include but are not limited to the 
previous employer, employee associa-
tions, union representatives and griev-
ance committees or organizations. 
Whenever documentary evidence 
cannot be obtained, the State agency 
shall substitute a collateral contact. 
The State agency is responsible for ob-
taining verification from acceptable 
collateral contacts provided by the 
household. 
(ii) If the household and State 
agency are unable to obtain requested 
verification from these or other 
sources because the cause for the quit 
resulted from circumstances that for 
good reason cannot be verified, such as 
a resignation from employment due to 
discrimination practices or unreason-
able demands by an employer or be-
cause the employer cannot be located, 
the household will not be denied 
access to the Program. 
(91 Stat. 958 (7 U.S.C. 2011-2029)) 
[Amdt. 132, 43 FR 47889, Oct. 17, 1978] 
EDITORIAL NOTE: For FEDERAL REGISTER ci-
tations affecting § 273.7, see the List of CFR 
Sections Affected in the Finding Aids sec-
tion of this volume. 
§ 273.8 Resource eligibility standards. 
(a) Uniform standards. The State 
agency shall apply the uniform na-
tional resource standards of eligibility 
to all applicant households, including 
those households in which members 
are recipients of federally aided public 
assistance, general assistance, or sup-
plemental security income. However, 
the State agency may consider house-
holds in which all members receive 
AFDC benefits and whose income does 
not exceed the gross income eligibility 
standards described under 
§ 273.10(a)(1) to have satisfied the re-
source eligibility criteria of this sec-
tion. 
(b) Maximum allowable resources. 
The maximum allowable resources, in-
cluding both liquid and nonliquid 
assets, of all members of the house-
hold shall not exceed $1,500 for the 
household, except that, for house-
holds of two or more members includ-
ing a member or members age 60 or 
over, such resources shall not exceed 
$3,000. 
(c) Definition of resources. In deter-
mining the resources of a household, 
the following shall be included and 
documented by the State agency in 
sufficient detail to permit verification: 
(1) Liquid resources, such as cash on 
hand, money in checking or savings ac-
counts, savings certificates, stocks or 
bonds, lump sum payments as speci-
fied in § 273.9(c)(8), funds held in indi-
vidual retirement accounts (IRA's), 
and funds held in Keogh plans which 
do not involve the household member 
in a contractual relationship with indi-
viduals who are not household mem-
• 
Food and Nutrition Service, USDA 
bers. In counting resources of house-
holds with IRA's or includable Keogh 
plans, the State agency shall include 
the total cash value of the account or 
plan minus the amount of the penalty 
(if any) that would be exacted for the 
early withdrawal of the entire amount 
in the account or plan; and 
(2) Nonliquid resources, personal 
property, licensed and unlicensed vehi-
cles, buildings, land, recreational prop-
erties, and any other property, provid-
ed that these resources are not specifi-
cally excluded under paragraph (e) of 
this section. The value of nonexempt 
resources, except for licensed vehicles 
as specified in paragraph (h) of this 
section, shall be its equity value. The 
equity value is the fair market value 
less encumbrances. 
(3) For households containing spon-
sored aliens (as defined in 
§ 273.11(h)(1)), resources shall also in-
clude that portion of the resources of 
an alien's sponsor and the sponsor's 
spouse (if living with the sponsor) 
which have been deemed to be those 
of the alien in accordance with the 
procedures established in § 273.11(h), 
unless the sponsored alien is otherwise 
exempt from this provision in accord-
ance with § 273.11(h). 
(d) Jointly owned resources. Re-
sources owned jointly by separate 
households shall be considered avail-
able in their entirety to each house-
hold, unless it can be demonstrated by 
the applicant household that such re-
sources are inaccessible to that house-
hold. If the household can demon-
strate that it has access to only a por-
tion of the resource, the value of that 
portion of the resource shall be count-
ed toward the household's resource 
level. The resource shall be considered 
totally inaccessible to the household if 
the resource cannot practically be sub-
divided and the household's access to 
the value of the resource is dependent 
on the agreement of a joint owner who 
refuses to comply. For the purpose of 
this provision, ineligible aliens or dis-
qualified individuals residing with the 
household shall be considered house-
hold members. Resources shall be con-
sidered inaccessible to persons residing 
in shelters for battered women and 
children, as defined in § 271.2, if 
§273.8 
(1) The resources are jointly owned 
by such persons and by members of 
their former household* and 
(2) The shelter resident's access to 
the value of the resources is depend-
ent on the agreement of a joint owner 
who still resides in the former house-
hold. 
(e) Exclusions from resources. In de-
termining the resources of a house-
hold, only the following shall be ex-
cluded: 
(1) The home and surrounding prop-
erty which is not separated from the 
home by intervening property owned 
by others. Public rights of way, such 
as roads which run through the sur-
rounding property and separate it 
from the home, will not affect the ex-
emption of the property. The home 
and surrounding property shall 
remain exempt when temporarily un-
occupied for reasons of employment, 
training for future employment, ill-
ness, or uninhabitability caused by 
casualty or natural disaster, if the 
household intends to return. House-
holds that currently do not own a 
home, but own or are purchasing a lot 
on which they intend to build or are 
building a permanent home, shall re-
ceive an exclusion for the value of the 
lot and, if it is partially completed, for 
the home. 
(2) Household goods, personal ef-
fects, including one burial plot per 
household member, and the cash value 
of life insurance policies. The cash 
value of pension plans or funds shall 
be excluded, except that Keogh plans 
which involve no contractual relation-
ship with individuals who are not 
household members and individual re-
tirement accounts (IRA's) shall not be 
excluded under this paragraph. 
(3) Licensed vehicles shall be ex-
cluded as specified in paragraph (h) of 
this section. The exclusion also in-
cludes unlicensed vehicles on those 
Indian reservations that do not re-
quire vehicles driven by tribal mem-
bers to be licensed. 
(4) Property which annually pro-
duces income consistent with its fair 
market value, even if only used on a 
seasonal basis. 
(5) Property, such as farm land and 
rental homes, or work related equip-
ment, such as the tools of a tradesman 
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or the machinery of a farmer, which is 
essential to the employment or self-
employment of a household member, 
except that rental homes which are 
used by households for vacation pur-
poses at some time during the year 
shall be counted as resources unless 
excluded by paragraph (e)(4) of this 
section. 
(6) Installment contracts for the sale 
of land or buildings if the contract or 
agreement is producing income con-
sistent with its fair market value. The 
exclusion shall also apply to the value 
of the property sold under the install-
ment contract, or held as security in 
exchange for a purchase price consist-
ent with the fair market value of that 
property. 
(7) Any governmental payments 
which are designated for the restora-
tion of a home damaged in a disaster, 
if the household is subject to a legal 
sanction if the funds are not used as 
intended; for example, payments made 
by the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development through the indi-
vidual and family grant program or 
disaster loans or grants made by the 
Small Business Administration. 
(8) Resources having a cash value 
which is not accessible to the house-
hold, such as but not limited to, irrevo-
cable trust funds, security deposits on 
rental property or utilities, property in 
probate, and real property which the 
household is making a good faith 
effort to sell at a reasonable price and 
which has not been sold. The State 
agency may verify that the property is 
for sale and that the household has 
not declined a reasonable offer. Verifi-
cation may be obtained through a col-
lateral contact or documentation, such 
as an advertisement for public sale in 
a newspaper of general circulation or a 
listing with a real estate broker. Any 
funds in a trust or transferred to a 
trust, and the income produced by 
that trust to the extent it is not avail-
able to the household, shall be consid-
ered inaccessible to the household if: 
(i) The trust arrangement is not 
likely to cease during the certification 
period and no household member has 
the power to revoke the trust arrange-
ment or change the name of the bene-
ficiary during the certification period; 
(ii) The trustee administering the 
funds is either: 
(A) A court, or an institution, corpo-
ration, or organization which is not 
under the direction or ownership of 
any household member, or (B) an indi-
vidual appointed by the court who has 
court imposed limitations placed on 
his/her use of the funds which meet 
the requirements of this paragraph; 
(iii) Trust investments made on 
behalf of the trust do not directly in-
volve or assist any business or corpora-
tion under the control, direction, or in-
fluence of a household member; and 
(iv) The funds held in irrevocable 
trust are either: 
(A) Established from the house-
hold's own funds, if the trustee uses 
the funds solely to make investments 
on behalf of the trust or to pay the 
educational or medical expenses of 
any person named by the household 
creating the trust, or (B) established 
from non-household funds by a non-
household member. 
(9) Resources, such as those of stu-
dents or self-employed persons, which 
have been prorated as income. The 
treatment of student income is ex-
plained in § 273.10(c) and the treat-
ment of self-employment income is ex-
plained in § 273.11(a). 
(10) Indian lands held jointly with 
the Tribe, or land that can be sold 
only with the approval of the Depart-
ment of the Interior's Bureau of 
Indian Affairs; and 
(11) Resources which are excluded 
for food stamp purposes by express 
provision of Federal statute. The fol-
lowing is the current listing of re-
sources excluded by Federal statute: 
(i) Payments received under the 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 
(Pub. L. 92-203, section 21(a)) or the 
Sac and Fox Indian claims agreement 
(Pub. L. 94-189); 
(ii) Payments received by certain 
Indian tribal members under Pub. L. 
94-114, section 6, regarding submar-
ginal land held in trust by the United 
States; 
(iii) Benefits received from the spe-
cial supplemental food program for 
-women, infants and children (WIC) 
(Pub. L. 92-443, section 9); 
(iv) Reimbursements from the Uni-
form Relocation Assistance and Real 
430 
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Enter any decrease of income in the correct budgeting 
cycle. Do not adjust the income any earlier than the 
correct benefit month unless the person who had the income 
is no longer in the BMS. For example, if a child moves 
out, he is no longer included in the BMS for the month 
following the change. Do not include his income because he 
is no longer in the BMS. 
807 Asset Standards 
To compute assets for UMAP, determine total assets, deduct 
exemptions. Compare the remainder to the UMAP asset limits. On 
combined G-financial/G-medical cases, use the G-financial policy for 
both cases. 
807.1 Asset Limits 
Asset limits are: 
1 person in BMS: $500 
2 or more persons in BMS: $750 
807.2 Assets 
Assets are anything of value that is available to the 
person. Count only equity value*. 
807.21 Applications and Ongoing Cases 
If the asset limit is met at any time in the month, it 
is met for the entire month. 
807.22 Multiple Ownership - When a person is part owner of 
property, determine the person's legal right to sell 
the property or his share. Multiple ownership can 
exit in 3 forms. 
1. Joint tenancy. Each owner has the legal right to 
sell and receive all benefit from 100% of the 
property. 
2. Tenancy in common. Each owner has the right to 
sell only his share. Unless a deed specifies 
this share, divide the equity value by the number 
of tenants in common. This is the value for each 
tenant in the property. 
3. Not specified. The property is simply recorded 
in the name of 2 or more persons. In thess 
cases, ownership is tenancy in common. 
Equity value Fair market value less anv debts against the property. 
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